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 The focus of this dissertation is the environmental tradeoffs of stover removal 
within the Corn Belt. The environmental tradeoffs considered are mainly concerned with 
managing soil erosion and soil quality. The analysis layers soil characteristics, 
management strategies and per acre costs using an integrated RUSLE2/WEPS model and 
an economic optimization model to illuminate a lower bound supply response. Different 
assumptions were tested in regards to sustainability, prices, and market integration for 
five states and 18,760 soil types throughout the Corn Belt. Sustainability was defined to 
limit soil erosion from wind and water to 5 tons/acre/year and the soil organic matter 
metric (SCI) to be positive. The results of the modeling exercise show how different costs 
for erosion, biomass and conservation management will affect outcomes at the farm level 
under different scenarios. This analysis considers how prices for stover and incentives for 
management practices through different price regimes could change the outcomes for 
different biorefinery locations.  The integration of farms into a single market place 
additionally considered the tradeoffs of the heterogeneous farmers and transportation 












Environmental conservation programs in the United States typically focus on soil erosion 
and the protection of wildlife populations.  Several methods and programs have been 
developed to decrease and limit the amount of soil lost to wind, rill, and water erosion.  
From establishing set-aside acreage to changing tillage, practices have decreased erosion 
in several areas of the country.  However, as policies consider changing land 
management strategies to remove biomass for bioenergy production or alternatively to 
meet a demand for low-cost animal feed, there are tradeoffs with environmental services 
and long-term environmental effects that need to be considered for the long-term 
sustainability of the removal of stover.  Under the assumption that biomass feedstock 
production will be constrained by land availability, feedstocks alternatively will be 
produced from waste products or as part of a value-added supply system.  Corn stover, as 
part of a value-added system, has the potential to supply the biofeedstock market an 
estimated 170 to 256 million dry tons annually, depending on yield and tillage 
assumptions (U.S. Department of Energy, 2011).  Wilhelm et al.  (2007) and Muth, 
Bryden and Nelson (In Press) identified soil organic carbon, wind and water erosion, 
plant nutrient balances, soil water and temperature dynamics, soil compaction and off-site 






 Harvesting stover has the potential to change land management strategies and has 
several environmental and production tradeoffs for the farmer and society that need to be 
evaluated regionally and at the field level. Stover residues have increased in volume as a 
result of higher plant populations, the usage of fungicides, hybrid seeds and decreases in 
residue breakdown from increased conservation tillage practices (Jeschke, 2011).  Stover 
provides certain ecosystem services when left on the field, which include protection from 
erosion, increased soil organic matter, nutrients, improved soil structure and water 
holding capacity, though these benefits vary with quantity, climate and management 
practices (Andrews, 2006).  In addition, the economic and ecosystem value attributed to 
stover in the field, depends on soil temperature, erosion rates, increases in organic matter, 
increased carbon sequestration, reduced fuel consumption, lower maintenance and labor 
costs (Deen and Kataki, 2003, Lal, et al., 1999, Lankoski, et al., 2004, Toliver, 2010).  
Several studies have examined the link between soil characteristics and the dynamics of 
stover removal on erosion (Johnson, et al., 2006, Mann, et al., 2002, Reicosky, et al., 
1995). 
 As such, a continuous, reliable and sustainable biomass supply of stover is 
dependent on several spatially explicit variables that affect the economic and 
environmental sustainability aspects of stover removal throughout the Corn Belt.  
Assuming that a market for stover is viable, farmers need to be able to decide whether 
they should harvest corn stover, given these tradeoffs.  The variety in management and 
conservation practices and their effectiveness, translates into greater uncertainty in the 
marketplace about the long-term and local effects of removal.  Policy has the opportunity 
to guide these decisions in order to minimize on- and off-site externalities.  Best 
management strategies and potential conflicts with current conservation policies may 
result in a farmers being conservative in harvesting, or potentially unwilling to participate 
in the market.  However, adding the potential profits from stover collection may change 
the marginal price to offset conservation practices. These include the potential of 
adoption of conservation management strategies like no-till and cover crops. Or without 
additional conservation management, a stover market could incentivize removal with 





replacement remains economical, and soil quality is not significantly diminished.  The 
objective of this study is to evaluate the economic and environmental tradeoffs, 
specifically those affecting soil resources, through optimizing profit on a per acre basis 
from the production of harvesting corn, soybean and stover with the effects of nutrient 
applications, erosion and conservation being included in the analysis.  The analysis is 
considered on a per acre basis without making assumptions about the spillover effects on 
neighboring parcels. This section aims to quantify these economic tradeoffs with an 
integrated water and soil erosion model based on location specific properties, soil 
characteristics and management decisions commonly found throughout Corn Belt. 
1.2. Literature Review 
Addressing some of the limitations to sustainably harvesting stover starts with current 
field management practices, which include tillage and nutrient management.  The U.S. 
Department of Energy publication, U.S. Billion-ton Update, Biomass Supply for a 
Bioenergy and Bioproducts Industry (BTSU) assumes that stover residues will be 
removed from reduced or no-till land and assumes that none will be removed from land 
in conventional tillage
1
(U.S. Department of Energy, 2011).  Conservation tillage 
practices vary throughout the country based on soil type, crop and rotation.  Of the 83 
million acres in corn production in 2008, 21% was in no-till, 1.4% ridge-till, 17.8% in 
mulch-till, and 24.3% in reduced tillage (Conservation Technology Information Center, 
2008).  Different tillage techniques will vary the amount of residues available for harvest.  
Adoption of tillage practices vary based on several producer and farm characteristics, in 
addition to local, state and national agency requirements (Bultena and Hoiberg, 1983).  
Farmers may not adopt conservation practices due to a divergence in perceptions of 
economic costs and environmental benefits. 
                                                 
 
1
 Conventional tillage is a practice in which producers use a disc or plow to incorporate residues into the 
soil post-harvest, leaving less than 15% residue.  Conservation tillage includes, no-till (> 30% cover), 





 The farmer’s economic decision weighs the direct costs of undertaking 
conservation measures and replacement costs through increased inputs and increased 
equipment costs with the opportunity costs of forgone future productivity through soil 
losses (Barbier, 1998, Javurek, et al., 2007, Larson, et al., 2001).  Failing to recognize the 
link between environmental factors and incentivizing stover harvest may create 
unintended consequences in conservation planning of natural resources.  Consider for a 
moment that farmers have numerous tradeoffs that occur in the corn grain and stover 
harvesting decision.  In order to maintain short-term productivity of the land, a farmer 
will manage soil health and the amount of erosion through management techniques and 
nutrient replacement.  Although there are several other tradeoffs that the farmer makes, 
these two non-market goods are influenced by the relative prices of conservation 
practices, stover returned to the field, irrigation (if applicable) and nutrients. Farmers 
regardless of conservation practices will still be producing some erosion and some level 
of soil health at a cost. These costs are estimated based on the alternative marketable 
goods, as environmental goods do not often have a market price. 
 The marginal private benefits and costs may not induce conservation tillage 
adoption. Therefore, the USDA National Resource Conservation Service suggests 30% of 
the field to be covered in the spring to prevent soil erosion with the additional tolerance 
level (T-Factor) that soil erosion is estimated to be no more than 3 to 5 tons of 
soil/acre/year
2
(Gallagher, et al., 2003).  The productivity losses of erosion, except in the 
extreme cases, can take several decades to realize through decreased yields.  
Additionally, due to improved seed varieties, irrigation and weather, yields can remain 
constant or improve even when considering soil losses.  Some of the effects of erosion 
may be mitigated through alternative management strategies like using cover crops, green 
manure and precision agriculture (Tyndall, et al., 2011).  Though it is estimated that 
                                                 
 
2
 In order to maintain lands with soil erosion under the tolerable limits, producers are eligible for certain 
government programs and assistance under EQUIP, CRP, WEP.  Soils that are classified as highly erodible 





erosion between 2 and 5 tons/acre/year or 0.4-1 mm/year can balance soil production and 
losses, in low sloping areas (Montgomery, 2007).  Erosion over 40 tons/acre/year
3
 is 
considered extreme, 7 tons/acre/year is average for croplands in the United States, and for 
undisturbed forests erosion rates average about 0.02 tons/acre/year (Pimentel, et al., 
1995).  The effects of tillage on yields varies throughout the Corn Belt, and the benefits 
of conservation may not be immediately seen by the farmer as a proportion of the 
benefits can be attributed to future soil health and production and decreases to off-site 
costs (Barbier, 1998, Toliver, 2010).  In addition, the amount and the effect of residue left 
on the field depends on several factors (e.g. slope, soil characteristics, tillage, drainage, 
soil organic matter and carbon (SOM/SOC)) which need to be considered, although the 
interactions among these components are quite complex (Coulter and Nafziger, 2008). 
Previous work has also considered the stock of soil organic matter, fertilizer amounts and 
depth of topsoil, as important factors in crop rotation decisions given that the rotations 
are economically viable (Burt, 1981). 
 Nutrient replacement is a significant concern for stover harvest activities.  
Previous studies by Fernandez  and Sawyer (2007), have found that the NPK content of 
harvested stover also varies throughout the Corn Belt.  The effectiveness of nutrient 
replacement depends on mobilization, concentrations, application rates and erosion.  
Harvesting stover has implications for nutrient removal and cycling beyond nitrogen, 
phosphorous and potassium, to decreasing micronutrients like calcium, magnesium and 
sulfur. Alternatively, stover remaining in the field can affect the absorption rates of 
nutrient application.  Each of these effects can impact long-term yields(Sawyer and 
Mallarino, 2007).  Brechbill, Tyner and Ileleji (2008) calculate that nutrient replacement 
costs for NPK content of the stover is approximately $17.23 per metric ton of stover 
removed, but do not consider the costs of replacing other micronutrients that stover 
returns to the soil.  Thompson and Tyner (2011) estimate that the cost of replacing 
micronutrients is estimated to be $2.00 Mg
-1
 and that total nutrient replacement costs are 
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, which accounted for over half the harvest costs.  Estimates 
vary based on fertilizer costs, which change spatially and temporally, and with crop 
rotation (U.S. Department of Energy, 2011). 
 Several additional factors affect the amount of stover available for removal.  
Rainfall and temperature during different phases of the growth cycle and harvest, along 
with fertilizer application, are the main driving factors in corn yields, as well as the 
resulting quantities of  biomass (Cantero-Martinez, et al., 2006, Mann, et al., 2002).  
Stover residues have increased in volume as a result of higher plant populations and 
yield, the usage of fungicides and hybrid seeds, and decreases in residue breakdown from 
tillage practices (Jeschke, 2011).  In addition, the economic and ecosystem value 
attributed to stover in the field depends on soil temperature, erosion rates, increases in 
organic matter, increased carbon sequestration, reduced fuel consumption, lower 
maintenance and labor costs (Deen and Kataki, 2003, Lal, et al., 1999, Lankoski, et al., 
2004, Toliver, 2010).  Harvesting stover impacts nutrient removal and cycling, beyond 
nitrogen, phosphorous and potassium to micronutrients like calcium, magnesium and 
sulfur, while leaving it in the field can affect the absorption rates of nutrient application, 
both can impact long-term yields (Sawyer and Mallarino, 2007). 
 Several studies have looked at the linkage between soil characteristics and the 
dynamics of stover removal on erosion (Johnson, et al., 2006, Mann, et al., 2002, 
Reicosky, et al., 1995).  Although there are many factors that affect the soil 
characteristics in a field or region, the presence of SOC in agricultural soils has been 
shown to be an important but, imperfect signal on soil health and yields through direct 
and indirect feedback effects (Reeves, 1997).  Of the soil organic matter from residues 
that is returned to the soil, roughly 58% of it is converted into SOC.  Accumulation of 
SOC depends on the rate at which biomass is added to the soil minus the rate at which 
erosion and biological oxidation are decreasing the SOC stocks.  In general, soil 
cultivation decreases the amount of soil organic carbon available, by increasing the rates 
of oxidation and erosion.  Although a majority of the SOM comes from plant roots, the 





wind and water erosion.  In addition to surface crop residue, rotation and cover crops 
along with conservation covers, increase the amount of biomass available for this 
biological process (Follett, 2001). Accounting for soil organic matter losses, a greater 
percentage of stover may be required to remain on the ground, given that carbon turnover 
in the soil may be a slower process than the potential effects of erosion on yields 
(Johnson, et al., 2006, Johnson, et al., 2006, Wilhelm, et al., 2007). 
 The environmental and management limitations of stover harvest are weighed 
with the economic decisions.  Private costs to the farmer may include increased nutrient 
and management costs, and public costs to society may be incurred through increased 
nutrient runoff, erosion, decreases in soil organic carbon, and micronutrient losses that 
affect the long-term productivity of the land.  These costs and concerns were identified as 
potential information barriers to market participation for farmers choosing to harvest and 
market corn stover (Sawyer and Mallarino, 2007, Tyndall, et al., 2011).  The 
environmental and economic factors vary throughout the Corn Belt, suggesting different 
marginal costs of stover and regional limitations to harvesting.  These heterogeneous and 
temporal costs affect supply density, which in turn determines plant locations, 
profitability, and environmental implications of removal.  When considering the removal 
of corn stover from agricultural fields in the Midwest, the benefits and costs associated 
with changes in management are considered for the farmers.  The biofuels market 
opportunities for stover harvesting and marketing must weigh the additional profits of 
stover with the increased nutrient management costs, environmental opportunity costs 
and the potential changes to yields. 
 As farmers will need to choose the optimal amount of stover harvested while 
minimizing the effects of removal on soil erosion and the health of the soil, the problem 
can be formulated into an optimization problem to identify key tradeoffs between these 
decisions.  McConnell(1983) used optimal control theory to identify the key tradeoffs in 
conservation management in soil conservation, concluding that farmers will erode the soil 
up until the point at which the marginal costs of erosion is equal to the marginal revenue 





private and social objectives were identical.  Barbier (1988) updates the McConnell 
model by adding in the temporal effects of erosion, noting that as the discount factor 
increases it creates incentives for erosion, as the effects of erosion may take longer to 
realize.  Two major conclusions that this work emphasizes are that a change in output and 
input prices may have contradictory effects on soil erosion. Primarily, as price increases 
result in short-term gains and lead to intensification in production, this often these short-
term gains can negatively impact soil resources.  However, as profitability increases over 
time, there may be additional incentives to conserve soil, as soil quality leads to better 
yields with fewer inputs. These timing issues are highlighted in the dynamics of the corn 
stover market, as without environmental constraint the additional revenues may 
disproportionately affect future soil conservation. Additionally, when considering the 
dynamic optimization of the problem, limitations on the stock variables related to the 
depth of topsoil and current availability of soil organic matter will alter where the 
conditions are binding (Burt, 1981). The short term effects of removal can be offset by 
additional applications of nutrients or improved varieties of seeds, while the long-term 
effects will be mitigated through management practices, crop rotation, and limiting 
harvest activities on environmentally sensitive soils. Key metrics of soil productivity will 
also be measured through the levels of soil organic matter and soil erosion. 
1.3. Methods 
1.4. Integrated Environmental Model and Scenarios 
Through management practices of the farm, a farmer can choose strategies that benefit 
both the environment and their per acre profit margins through the removal of stover and 
application of conservation practices.  Accounting for the spatial heterogeneity of soil 
dynamics and erosion is accomplished using an integrated model which combines the 
Revised Universal Soil Loss Equation (RUSLE2) and the Wind Erosion Equation 
(WEPS).  These models are coupled with databases that contain relevant climate, soils, 
management weights, yields and location specific properties. This integrated model was 
chosen to illuminate the environmental effects from changes in soil erosion and soil 





removal, soil erosion from wind and water and soil organic matter are often separated 
analytically. This shortcoming neglects that the magnitude of change in some areas may 
result in larger effects to the soil quality.    
 The integrated RUSLE2 and WEPS model was developed as an assessment tool 
for residue availability throughout the United States
4
.  Most recently the model was used 
to assess the sustainability of stover removal in Iowa (Muth and Bryden, 2012).  The 
RUSLE2 model simulates field conditions at the farm level based on soil, climate, field 
management, cropping, and residue effects to estimate the effects of daily weather 
patterns on water based erosion.  RUSLE2 is mainly used in conservation planning and 
controlling for the effects of rill and interrill types of erosion on land usage from crop, 
pasture, range and forest lands (Foster, 2005).  The WEPS model uses several of the same 
field level conditions to simulate the effects of wind on soil erosion by direction and 
magnitude.  WEPS is comprised of several submodels (weather, hydrological, residue, 
soils).  These models simulate the likely erosion response to a variety of environmental 
and management factors, and as such these models enumerate the potential outcomes of 
farm-level decisions.  The combinations of these two erosion models are useful in order 
to calculate the sustainability of total erosion from both wind and water through the Soil 
Conditioning Index (SCI). 
 These models calculate the long-term average effects of wind and water erosion. 
Typically these models have been used in parallel to conservation planning activities. 
However, there are limitations when considering these effects in a dynamic market 
system, such as the production of corn, soybeans, and stover, as switching field practices 
would affect these averages.  Other field-level conditions, like changes in precipitation, 
temperatures or yields would also have consequences on these averages.  
                                                 
 
David Muth and his colleagues at Idaho National Lab built the integrated model and provided the data and 





 The management options used for this economic analysis can be found in Table 
1-1, and an example and description of one of the scenarios can be found in Table 1-2.  
Table 1-2 describes the technical aspects management scheme and the timing of 
operations throughout the growing year for the RUSLE2/WEPS model.  Changes in 
supply density and environmental outcomes can separately or simultaneously be affected 
by these different management regimes.  The discrete management choices in the 
integrated model result in non-continuous output in stover.  For example, a soil type may 
be harvesting at the highest rate of removal, but additional gains in harvestable amounts 
may only come from adding a cover crop or decreasing tillage.  As supply sheds are 
delineated, the distributions of these outcomes over space and time (in terms of crop 
rotation and contract length) are going to be critical. 
Table 1-1: Regimes for the Integrated RUSLE2/WEPS Model 
Crop 
Rotation 




NCC No cover crop 
100rye 100% Rye winter cover 
40rye, 60clover 40% Rye winter cover, 60% Clover winter cover 
60rye, 40radish 





Reduced Tillage: Chisel Plow, Disk tandem light 
finishing 




NRH No Residue Harvest 
MRH Moderate Residue Harvest: Approximately 35% 
MHH Moderately High Residue Harvest: Approximately 50% 
HRH High Residue Harvest: Approximately 80% 
Barrier 
Regime 
NVB No vegetative barrier 
SVB 
Strip vegetative barrier: modeled as cool season grass 
3m wide in middle of slope 









Table 1-2: Example of the Regime Combination for the Integrated Model 








5/10/1 Planter, double disk 






9/17/1 Harvest, killing crop 





5/25/2 Drill or airseeder, 
double disk, w/ fluted 
coulters 
Soybean, group 0 




9/12/2 Harvest, killing crop 
20pct standing stubble 
 
Note: The naming convention for this example is crop management zone 1 (CMZ01), corn-soybean 
rotation (CG, SB), no-till (NT), no stover harvested (NRH), no cover crop (NCC), no vegetative barrier 
(NVB). 
 These scenarios represent the most likely cropping and management decisions for 
the Corn Belt.  Given the diversity in landscape of the region, the results from the 
integrated model were related back to geographic locations based on SURGO soil type, 
slope, 2008-2010 cropping rotations, and tillage practice
5
.  Yields for corn grain were 
based on POLYSIS estimates at the county level.  These were not included in the original 
dataset, and therefore are backed out from the total biomass harvested in the first year, 
based on the percentages of removal and then divided by 56 to convert the amounts into 
bushels per acre.  Yield drag estimates were then subtracted from these estimates.  The 
scenarios were undertaken based on soil type, under the assumption that farmers will 
choose management practices to the dominant soil conditions of their farm for a three-
year period.  These choices are limited by their respective effects on the t-factor, or 
overall erosion calculated within the model.  Erosion rates above the prescribed t-factor 
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 The data for these layers can be found the NRCS Soil data mart (SURGO, 
http://soildatamart.nrcs.usda.gov/), Geospatial gateway (Elevation and Cropland Data Layer 






occur when adding the removal of stover beyond these management practices.  Based on 
the data from RUSLE2/WEPS we assigned rotations, in order to not allow the 
optimization model to switch rotations mid-period, the values were discounted to the 
present. In fixing the rotations, we limit the number of assumptions about future farm 
decisions that may be based on a multitude of factors, beyond the scope of this study. 
However, this also limits the analysis to the potential lower bound of the supply response, 
given the current rotation decisions.  
 The integrated modeling framework outputs four variables critical in the 
economic optimization framework.  Important variables from this model are those 
relating to wind (windEros) and water erosion (waterEros), the Soil Conditioning Index 
(SCI) and the total biomass removed by year (totBioRem(yr)).  The SCI is used to predict 
whether the management practices result in maintained or increased levels of soil organic 
matter.  The SCI combines the effects of organic matter returned to the soil (SCI_OM); 
field operations (SCI_FO) such as tillage, fertilizer application, harvesting etc.; and the 
erosion factor (SCI_ER).  The values of the SCI signal the trend in organic matter given 
these factors.  It does not predict the amount or the rate of change of organic matter.  It 
should be interpreted within the context of the soil class. As such, poor soils with a SCI 
near zero are maintained as poor soils (Soil Quality Institute, 2003).  Wind (windEros) 
and water erosion (waterEros) variables dictate both on-site and off-site costs of the 
production decisions.  On-site costs can be offset using conservation management 
techniques (e.g.  cover crops, barrier strips and tillage), increased nutrient replacement 
and potentially decreases in yields over time.  Off-site costs have to do with sediment 
delivery into watersheds or the transfer of soil resources to other locations within or 
external to the farm.  Ultimately, the driving economic factor will be quantity of stover 
harvested, or total biomass (totBioRem(yr)), indicating the producer’s decision to 
participate in the biomass market. 
 We surmise that the farmer can choose the crop rotation, cover crop regime, 
tillage regime, residual removal regime, yield regime and vegetative barrier regime 





each of the five states and their respective soil types included in this analysis, Iowa 
(4493), Illinois (4485), Indiana (2941), Minnesota (3861) and Nebraska (2980).  This 
results in over 14.4 million different combinations from the integrated erosion models.  
These results were then used in the following economic framework and related back to 
geographic locations in order to illustrate the potential agronomic and economic tradeoffs 
that may occur within a biofuels supply shed. 
1.5. Economic Framework 
The heterogeneous nature of farms in the agricultural landscape for Corn Belt has been 
used to incorporate the differences in cropping patterns, soil characteristics and yields 
from an economic and environmental standpoint.  The farmer’s decision-making can then 
be viewed through a dynamic optimization framework, in which the farmer will choose to 
maximize profits from the production of corn, soybeans and stover subject to the 
production of these crops and their relative variable and environmental costs or 
regulatory constraint.  The general formulation of this objective is, 




Subject to an equation of motion, 
 ̇   ( ) (2) 
                                    (3) 
where δ is the farmer (i) discount rate, p is the price of the output, y is a function of 
output for each cropping rotation i, (continuous corn, corn-soybean, corn-corn-bean), 
based on s(t) soil loss, x(t) soil quality, and z(t) a vector of inputs (e.g.  replacement costs 
for fertilizer).  The value of z in any period depends on activities in the previous period 
with regards to crop, stover removal and erosion.  This model has been widely used for 
looking at the effects of soil losses on productivity from an economic standpoint (Barbier, 
1998, Barbier, 1988, McConnell, 1983) and is useful for looking at the effects of current 





into economic and conservation decision making, our model estimates the optimization 
problem to have costs and revenues adjusted to the rotation decision with profits adjusted 
to a single year.  The optimization is as follows, 
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   is measured as ($/acre). 
  is the discount factor 
i is the crop choice [corn, soybeans, stover] 
pi is a vector of output prices ($) based on 2012 Purdue Crop Budgets and stover prices 
are based on  Thompson and Tyner (2011) 
YSB are soybean yields were used from the SURGO databases, which gives the 
average yield for soils in the county 
r is a vector of input prices ($) based 2012 Purdue Crop Budgets  
z are replacement nutrients [fertilizer(N,P,K)] and variable and fixed costs related to the 
production and harvest, nutrient replacement equations explicitly are in Equations  









Table 1-3: Managements by Rotation and Tillage for RUSLE2/WEPS 
Rotation Tillage Management 
Rotational Corn 
NT 
Planter, double disk opener w/fluted coulter 
Harvest, killing crop 50pct standing stubble 
RT 
Planter, double disk opener w/fluted coulter 
Harvest, killing crop 50pct standing stubble 
Rotational Soybeans 
NT 
Drill or airseeder, double disk, w/ fluted coulters 
Harvest, killing crop 20pct standing stubble 
RT 
Drill or airseeder, double disk, w/ fluted coulters 
Harvest, killing crop 20pct standing stubble 
Chisel,st.pt. 
Disk, tandem light finishing 
Continuous Corn 
NT 
Planter, double disk opener w/fluted coulter 
Harvest, killing crop 50pct standing stubble 
RT 
Planter, double disk opener w/fluted coulter 
Harvest, killing crop 50pct standing stubble 
   
 These managements designated by the integrated model can be found in Table 
1-3. Corresponding per acre prices and costs can be found in Table 1-4.  Practices 
relating to the harvest and removal of stover were included in the harvest cost estimate, 
and practices relating to the cover crops were included in the cover crop prices.  Farms 
may choose to use these calculations as part of their overall farm management strategy, 
as it is likely that a farm will have a couple of different cropping systems and soil 
conditions throughout their operations.  
 As the effects of erosion can be difficult to quantify in terms of yield reductions, 
except in extreme events, these losses can take years to be apparent
6
.  Losses in 
productivity resulting from erosion are twofold; losses can be in quantity, through the 
physical loss of topsoil, and in quality, through the degradation and depletion of nutrients.   
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It is important to note that here are several additional factors that go into assessing the effects of erosion on 






Table 1-4: Cost Estimates For the Model 
Item  unit Value 
Corn
7
 $/ Bushel $     7.00 
Soybeans $/ Bushel $    12.00 
Stover
8




100% Rye $/acre $    31.69 
 
40/60 Rye-Clover mix $/acre $    36.61 
 




Nitrogen $/ lb. $       0.54 
 
Phosphorus $/ lb. $       0.74 
 
Potassium $/ lb. $       0.57 
Vegetative barrier $/acre $  100.00 
Stover Harvest (includes net wrap, Fuel and labor) $/ton $    34.03 







Continuous corn (CG) $/acre $    78.80 
 
Corn in Rotation $/acre $    65.06 
 




Continuous corn (CG) $/acre $    78.80 
 
Corn in Rotation $/acre $    68.41 
 
Soybeans in Rotation $/acre $    74.67 
Misc.  Costs (seed, pesticides, hauling, drying, etc.)
10
   
 Continuous Corn yields less than 122 Bu/ac $/acre $  256.00 
 Continuous Corn yields greater than 184 Bu/ac $/acre $  294.00 
 Continuous Corn yields between 122 and 184 bu/ac $/acre $  289.00 
 Corn in Rotation, yields less than 130 Bu/ac $/acre $  252.00 
 Corn in Rotation, yields greater than 193 Bu/ac $/acre $  285.00 
 Corn in Rotation, yields between 130 and 193 Bu/ac $/acre $  282.00 
 Soybeans in Rotation $/acre $  150.00 
                                                 
 
7
 These costs are based on Dobbins, C., A. Miller, B. Nielsen, T. J. Vyn, S. Casteel, B. Johnson, K.Wise, 
and B. Erickson.  (2012) 2012 Purdue Crop Cost & Return Guide, Purdue Extension.. 
8
 These costs are based on Thompson, J.L., and W.E. Tyner. "Corn Stover for Bioenergy Production: Cost 
Estimates and Farmer Supply Response.", ibid. Adjusted to a $45.97 farmgate, after adjusting for fixed 
harvest and storage costs originally included the paper.   
9
These costs are based on Duffy, M. (2012) Estimated Costs of Crop Production in Iowa - 2012. Iowa State 
University Extension. 
10
 These costs are based on Dobbins, C., A.  Miller, B.  Nielsen, T.  J.  Vyn, S.  Casteel, B.  Johnson, 





For this analysis, quantity lost is measured through total erosion, accounting for wind and 
water erosion, and qualitatively through the Soil Conditioning Index.  Accounting for 
these decreases can be offset to varying degrees through other inputs and technologies 
that will affect yield (Burt, 1981).  However, the complex nature of soil dynamics and 
ongoing debate in the literature of the extent of erosion on yields, accounting for 
productivity losses is accomplished through the nutrient replacement approach and 
constraints on soil organic matter and erosion.  This allows for a simplification in the 
amount, type, and returns to inputs needed to maintain yields.  Physical losses, through 
degradation of soil carbon are also important, though more information is needed on-site 
to determine how farmers quantitatively will account for diminished carbon in terms of 
productivity and management decisions. These decisions will be likely based on current 
soil conditions in terms of depth of top soil, erosion potential and available nutrients 
already within the soil. In addition, the relative price dynamics between the relative 
prices of stover, the prices of nutrients and the maintenance costs to conservation 
practices can alter the long-term dynamics of the decision making framework. 
 Accounting for the long-term dynamics of this problem is complicated, as year to 
year changes may alter the path of long-term erosion.  To simplify the dynamic nature of 
the problem the following assumptions are made.  Pimentel (1995), estimates that the 
effects of 17 tons/hectare/year, assuming a soil depth of 15 cm, a 5% slope on loamy soil 
containing 4% organic matter, in conventional tillage, in the United States, would result 
in 8% lower corn yields in the next year, without offsetting the losses in nutrients, water 
and other inputs.  Bishop and Allen (1989), estimate that the relationship between yields 
and erosion is 
        
      (8) 





where    is the incremental loss of soil and   is a constant that varies by crop and slope
11
.  
In our model,    is a result of the integrated RUSLE/WEPS model and is the net wind 
and water erosion determined by slope, rotation, crop, cover crop (CC), tillage (till), 
residue removal (HR), and vegetative barrier (VBR) choices.  Since we want to isolate 
the contribution of controlling for erosion in the current period, the equation of motion 
needs to assume that the yield trend is zero.  This allows for a simplification in the 
amount, type, and returns to inputs needed to maintain yields.  In order for the equation 
of motion to be in a steady-state, the following constraint must also be true, 
               (10) 
   (     )        (11) 
       (12) 
where   or    must be zero.  Offsetting erosion    is captured through the changes in 
nutrient, management choices and soil conditioning indices.  Therefore, the driving 
assumption is that even in the presence of erosion, offsetting the negative yield effects in 
terms of quality can be accomplished through nutrient replacement and maintaining a 
positive SCI.  This does not hold true, if the logarithmic change in yields is not zero from 
year to year.  Additionally, the stock of soil resources in a location will have change the 
impact of erosion, as losses will disproportionately affect soils that are already limited. 
As such, larger volumes of erosion would have disproportionate effects on yields, 
through both the quality and quantity effects of soil losses. Additional stock variables 
could be considered in future research pertaining to the quantities and quality of the soil 
resources available. Unfortunately, at this time a wide scale analysis of soil organic 
matter throughout the Corn Belt has not been done. 
                                                 
 
11
Though since Bishop and Allen (Bishop, J., J. Allen, and W.B.E. Dept. 1989. The on-site costs of soil 
erosion in Mali: World Bank, Policy Planning and Research Staff, Environment Department.), was 
published the magnitude of erosion losses is also considered to be affected by soil type, climate, land 
preparation, management etc.  (Enters, T. 1998. Methods for the economic assessment of the on-and off-site 





 In our simulations, the integrated modeling framework assesses erosion and 
biomass yields based on deterministic yields that are entered by the user.  The 
complicated feedback effects of soil erosion on yields are still widely debated throughout 
the agronomic literature. The threshold where quality and quantity effects of wind and 
water erosion will dampen yields is still unknown.  However, scenarios were undertaken 
assuming a drag on yields, without explicitly identifying what would cause such declines, 
but are useful in illustrating how the decision making process may change in the presence 
of yield reductions. 
 This result simplifies the effect of erosion through time.  To maintain yield levels, 
nutrient replacement values were based on the average annual quantities lost per ton of 
erosion found in Pimentel (1995) and from estimates used in calculating EQUIP 
payments (Natural Resources Conservation Service, 2010).  For inputs needed to 
maintain yields in period t, the following constraints (Equations 13-15) were added for 
fertilizer usage.  The equation is based on the Tri-state Fertilizer Recommendations For 
Corn, Soybeans, Wheat and Alfalfa (Vitosh, et al., 1995) for nitrogen, phosphorus and 
potassium and with recommendations for stover nutrient replacement (Brechbill and 
Tyner, 2008) and erosion losses (Pimentel, et al., 1995).  The units for z are pounds per 
acre.   
    (     )       {              }                         
            
13) 
    (     )                                   (14) 
    (     )                                      15) 
NCredit is the nitrogen credit given by the previous crop. Soybean credit is 30 lbs./acre.  
CR is the portion of nutrients removed per pound and by bushel (for corn, 0.37 of P and 
0.27 of K, for Soybeans 0.8 of P and 1.4 of K).  These are averages; individual farms and 
soils will have specific recommendations based on levels already present in the soil.  The 





the overall amount of erosion,   .  The effects of these practices on erosion are calculated 
within the integrated model, though it is important to include the costs of adopting these 
practices within our optimization model.  Therefore, z(other) will equal 1 if the practice is 
in place. 
 The SCI metric to measure whether or not these practices improve or degrade soil 
organic carbon was calculated.  Though as the metric is descriptive and not quantitative, 
it was not given a cost, nor is its outcome constrained, except in the case of imposing 
sustainability criteria through external sources.  The metric describes how the 
management practice regime will affect the quality of the soil already there - meaning if 
the soil class is a 3, management and harvesting of stover could degrade soil resources 
(negative SCI)or improve soil resources (positive SCI).  The metric does not indicate at 
what level the SCI would need to be in order to improve the value or productivity of the 
land.  Benefits for soil organic carbon levels are highly dependent on the type of cover 
crop chosen, what root structure looks like, timing etc.  Additionally, other effects 
(compounded with fertilizer applications, weather, etc.) may affect fertility.  Therefore, 
this metric is reported but not explicitly a factor in the decision making process. 
 There are several key aspects to focus on when considering this potential market.  
Different management regimes will affect the profitability, density and supply area, as 
well as, the environmental outcomes (both erosion and SCI) on a per acre basis.  Chapter 
1 focuses on these outcomes at the soil/farm level given different incentives and 
constraints, and Chapter 2 focuses on the wider marketplace and regulations that may 
produce these outcomes.  In terms of the integrated modeling framework, environmental 
outcomes will be affected by crop rotation, the quantities of biomass harvested and the 
usage of conservation practices (tillage, cover crops and barrier strips).  Biomass 
outcomes will also be affected by crop rotation and conservation practices.  The scenarios 
were chosen to illustrate the tradeoffs between the environmental and economic 
incentives.  The analysis for this paper illustrates the optimal decision making process 






Table 1-5: Sensitivity Scenarios 
Scenarios  Description  
Optimal  
High crop prices ($7/bu corn, $12/bu soybeans, $80/ton  stover); Erosion 
Nutrient replacement rates of (16.01- 0.064-131.329), (NPK lbs/acre) 
NoCoverNoErosion
RR 
High crop prices; No Cover Crops; No Erosion Nutrient Replacement 
HighStoverP 
$7/bu corn, $12/bu soybeans, $90.97/ton  stover; Erosion Nutrient 
replacement rates of (16.01- 0.064-131.329), (NPK lbs/acre) 
LowStoverP 
$7/bu corn, $12/bu soybeans, $34.03/ton  stover; Erosion Nutrient 
replacement rates of (16.01- 0.064-131.329), (NPK lbs/acre) 
TValueErosion 




High crop prices; Erosion Nutrient Replacement rates of (2.32-1-0) (NPK 




High crop prices ($7/bu corn, $12/bu soybeans, $80/ton  stover); Erosion 
Nutrient replacement rates of (16.01- 0.064-131.329), (NPK lbs/acre); 
Forced Reduced Tillage, No Cover Crop and No Vegetative Barrier 
 
1.6. Results and Discussion 
 Descriptive statistics for state level profit, erosion, biomass harvested and NPK 
nutrient replacement rates can be found in Table 1-6 to Table 1-10, and the distribution of 
these outcomes spatially can be found in the respective figures through the section.  The 
state by state results for these scenarios (Table 1-5) are not constrained by land currently 
in agricultural production or crop rotation and represent the potential outcomes for this 
market.  In Section 1.5.6.1, land availability and intensive and extensive land use will be 
considered, along with sustainability limitations based on crop rotation in section1.6.7.  
One important caveat when looking at the profit calculated in the model is that it does not 
include overhead costs for grain and soybeans or additional storage or transportation 
costs that the farmer could potentially have to account for when making on farm 
decisions related to the harvesting of stover. 
 Although there are differences at the state-level there are several conclusions that 
are consistent by scenario.  The scenario Socially Optimal, which equates private and 





stover prices.  Farmers internalize the costs of erosion in their decision making process at 
the high replacement rate.  Stover prices were chosen through other studies that estimate 
that farmers will be incentivized to add additional acres to corn production to boost stover 
production (Thompson and Tyner, 2011).  This assumes a uniform price for biomass, 
regardless of distance to end demand markets and regional concentrations of supplies.  
Although there are many differences between states, counties and soil types, the model is 
constructed such that the market for stover is assumed to be the same across the entire 
sample area.  We constructed the Socially Optimal scenario, such that it will have similar 
effects in terms of management choices throughout the sample region and give a baseline 
comparison across state and county lines.  The expected differences are to be in the 
areas/soil types that choose to participate in the market and the rates of harvest.  Figure 
1-1 and Figure 1-2 indicate the optimal erosion rates and biomass available for harvest in 
each soil type. 
 Across all states, the optimal management choice for a majority of soil types 
under the Socially Optimal scenario was continuous corn, no-tillage, medium high 
residue harvest, 100% rye cover crop, with no vegetative barrier.  This management 
strategy is an expected result of the model given that profitability increases based on the 
ability to market stover continuously and that there is a cost to erosion.  As such, the 
outcomes for optimal rotation management in this section for all states, for all scenarios 
are continuous corn.  Additionally, the integrated models have on average, higher rates of 
erosion for corn-soybean rotations and when erosion has a higher perceived cost, as in the 
Socially Optimal case. Farmers will choose a continuous corn rotation coupled with 
100% rye to minimize erosion effects and maximize benefits.  As we see in section 1.6.7, 
when analyzing the optimal cover crop choices for corn-soybean and corn-corn-soybean 
rotations, the optimal choice of cover crop usage is no longer 100% rye.  The socially 
optimal scenario is intended to give an environmentally conservative baseline for soil 
types and regions participating in the market.  Assuming that farmers will internalize 
costs for soil erosion, such that changing economic incentives will increase (decrease) 
area participating or the amounts harvested simultaneously picking the optimal 





importance of erosion costs can be seen in the outcomes of the NoCoverNoErosionRR 
and NoConservation_LowErosionCost scenarios.  These scenarios reflect the potential 
for erosion and soil quality outcomes where these costs are not accounted for internally or 
if there are no incentives for conservation management. 
 The use of cover crops can increase the density of supply and therefore may be 
more efficient when looking at localized supply shed incentives.  Although the costs of 
cover crops are assumed to cover all of the costs of planting and killing the cover, 
depending on where in the state the farm is located and the soil type from which stover is 
harvested, farmers may gain an economic advantage in their usage.  When considering 
the incentives needed to spur the adoption of cover crops or to minimize erosion, the 
farmer’s internal price for erosion may drive these decisions, without any additional 
incentives needed (from the stover market or thorough subsidization).  Though there are 
several benefits to cover crops, only 11 to 18 percent of farmers currently use them in 
practice (Singer, et al., 2007).  This could be attributed to underestimated costs of using 
cover crops, especially in regards to the timing of seeding and killing of the cover.  Slight 
differences in erosion also may not be visible to farmers and there may be preferences in 
which crop to use as a cover for several reasons.  If farmers do not see the economic or 
social costs of erosion on-site, or they perceive the costs of cover crops to be high, then 
farmers are not likely to adopt cover crops.  Additionally, the benefits of erosion control 
vary depending on the location, soil type and other numerous factors that change through 
the landscape.  These benefits may also diminish as the farmer reaches certain thresholds 
of erosion control, and then the question becomes, does the additional ton of soil loss 
saved through adopting a practice really make a difference for farmer decision making.  
One of the extensions to this work in the future is to examine the amount of erosion, 
which would spur the adoption of cover crops.  However, if profit factors over 
stewardship, then farmers will choose cover crops only when it results in additional 
economic benefits.  Cover crops can provide not only the benefits of decreasing erosion, 





 Neglecting internalized costs but following regulatory suggestion of no more than 
5 tons/acre/year, the outcomes of the TvalueErosion scenario result in both erosion and 
harvest rates increasing in several areas over the Socially Optimal scenario.  This implies 
that internalized costs may decrease farmer participation in the market, if farmers 
perceive these costs to be higher than the costs imposed by non-binding regulation.  
Although it may be difficult to gauge farmer perceptions of environmental costs, other 
factors such as land value may proxy for these internal costs of erosion, and land rental 
contracts can prevent farmers from mining the soil resources.  Rising land values, 
potential volatility in crop prices and in inputs, like fertilizer and improved seed varieties, 
which offset the effects of some erosion, will affect these non-market values and 
perceptions of erosion.  If this is the case, then soil quality and long-term sustainability 
may be more important in the farmer’s decision making regardless of financial or 
regulatory obligation, reflecting higher internal costs.  Absent regulation or contracts, 
farmers with higher erosion costs would be already practicing cover crops, using barrier 
strips and conservation tillage.   
 In our scenarios, farms where the internal costs are not satisfied at the $80/ton 
stover price would be represented by soil types and regions that practice conservation but 
choose not to harvest.  However, as farmers have different perceived costs and attitudes 
towards conservation, these true costs may not be known or measurable.  Therefore, 
looking at compliance with regulations or in the absence of these costs is useful in 
analyzing the potential outcomes of policies on a variety of different types of farmers.  It 
should be noted that the current policy, USDA’s 5/tons/acre/year is not a strictly binding 
constraint, given issues with compliance and the variability in enforcement.  The scenario 
NoConservation_LowErosionCost (in which farmers do not practice any conservation), 
represent the potential downsides of incentivizing harvesting biomass when farmers see 
little to no costs to erosion or value to conservation practices.  These two extremes, with 
high internal costs and no internal costs, represent the potential upper and lower bounds 














































 If upstream participants are concerned with environmental outcomes but do not 
want to incur additional costs, then a strategy of choosing plant locations in absence of 
paying for additional conservation practices may be preferred.  When considering the 
scenario NoConservation_LowErosionCost, several soil types can sustainability (where 
erosion is under 5 tons/acre) harvest stover without additional conservation and without 
considering the private costs to erosion to the farmer or the biorefinery by locating the 
biorefinery plant in these areas.  In terms of market potential, there are approximately 
54,485,964 acres that could harvest stover under the 5 ton/acre/year limits, distributed 
throughout the five state sample area under the assumption of a continuous corn rotation, 
not restricted to land currently in production (Figure 1-3).  If we include a constraint on 
soil organic matter, the number of acres decreases to 27,082,748.  Conservatively, the 
amount of stover that could be sustainably harvested on these acres is approximately 
183.9 million tons, which is in line with the amount estimated by the BTSU (U.S. 
Department of Energy, 2011), if all of these acres were in continuous corn.   
Concentrations and in the regional markets will be more critical in determining where 
and how this market develops. 
 Market development is going to be dependent on supply and land management 
concerns described throughout the introductory section. Considerations on density of 
yields and rotations may then delineate the supply shed.  In some cases, the market will 
incentivize the use of conservation in order to output larger stover harvests.  On the 
demand-side, the additional quantities harvested from any one producer may decrease 
total facility transactions costs and adding additional incentives for local production may 
offset transportation costs. The structure of the market, in terms of competitiveness, may 
adjust the relative prices between conservation, harvest rates and transportation, such that 
only the farmers with the lowest average cost will participate, e.g. the soil types that need 
no conservation to harvest sustainably. This is an important consideration when 
considering the potential market for stover biomass and recommendations for 
management strategies. Although there are several aspects to this problem that will 
change the supply region and density, it is key to analyze these issues at a finer detail.  





regional level.  In Chapter 2, this is analyzed more closely using representative supply 
sheds around existing biofuel plants, building on the analysis in this chapter and taking 
into account aggregation, transportation and market-level integration.  Chapter 2 will also 
focus more on incentive structures that will induce some of the outcomes in this chapter. 
 In addition to the concerns over supply and land management, the contribution of 
stover to soil conservation and nutrient replacement will be an important aspect of the 
farmer decision making process. Nutrient replacement from erosion is difficult to 
generalize, as many farmers use soil testing in order to determine which nutrients are 
lacking in the soil.  Losses due to erosion are specific to soil type, location and type of 
erosion and may not be considered separately.  Therefore, the estimates from Pimentel 
(1995) may be much larger than what is actually needed.  The erosion-nutrient 
replacement illustrates the difference in possible behaviors if farmers have much lower 
nutrient replacement figures.  The USDA uses erosion nutrient replacement rates of 
(2.32-1-0)  in NPK lbs./acre in their benefit-cost analysis for the program EQUIP 
(Natural Resources Conservation Service, 2010).  These rates are significantly lower than 
those in Pimentel and, as such, the additional costs brought on by nutrient behavior, 
coupled with the low rates of erosion after the adoption of cover crops, do not spur any 
major regime changes.   
 However, when testing against the adoption of conservation management 
strategies (no-till, cover crops, vegetation barriers), the ‘price’ of erosion can determine 
how much biomass is removed and what the resulting level of erosion will be.  The price 
of erosion is considered through the alternatives of controlling for it, land values or 
replacement costs, instead of a defined market. Nutrient replacement rates are also 
reflective in the costs of harvesting stover, and are weighed with practices that will 
increase the amount of biomass available (e.g.  cover crops), the costs of replacing for 
erosion, and the yields with respect to grain.  Different studies indicate that nutrients 
within the stover can vary greatly in NPK content of the final product (Jeschke and 





these offsetting costs and benefits complicate incentives as management choices have 
interrelated outcomes when it comes to the costs of inputs. 
1.6.1. Iowa 
The optimal management choice for a majority (78%) of soil types or 25.2 million acres  
under the Socially Optimal scenario was continuous corn, no-tillage, medium high 
residue harvest, 100% rye cover crop, with no vegetative barrier.  Under this scenario, 
average profit per acre was $722, averaging 2.2 tons/acre of biomass, with an average 
erosion rate of 0.49 tons/acre/year and ranges in the state from 0.01 to 2.07 tons/acre/year 
(Table 1-6).  One hundred percent rye cover is the preferred cover crop for most of the 
harvested areas in this scenario, though two Iowa soil types chose a 60% rye, 40% radish 
cover crop, indicating that optimal erosion benefits were gained at a lower cost.  When 
analyzing soil types that did not choose the above management, 17% of land in Iowa 
chose not to harvest any stover.  Although, these soil types used 100% rye cover crop to 
minimize the effects of erosion, rates averaged 0.49 tons/acre/year.  Soil displacement 
through erosion results in approximately 105.53 million tons for this conservative 
scenario, with 89.8 million tons attributable to land harvesting stover.  Given that erosion 
has a high internal cost in this scenario, the usage of cover crops is warranted in order to 
maintain the quality and quantity of soil, even in the absence of stover harvested.  
Potentially, 25.2 million acres could harvest 477.1 million tons of stover under this 
scenario.  However, this is assuming that farmers will have a cost for erosion and thus the 
incentive to minimize erosion rates through the adoption of 100% rye cover.  When the 
internalized cost of erosion is much lower or non-existent, and there are no sustainability 





Table 1-6: Selected Estimates from Model Scenarios for Iowa (n= 4493) 
 
































Socially Optimal 722.41 0 - 3.34 2.218 
0.01 - 
2.07 
0.490 0.5 - 1.5 0.825 289.326 85.905 189.760 
NoCover 
NoErosionRR 720.97 1.65 - 3.07 2.517 
0.01 –
18.14 
2.374 -5.1 - 0.81 0.440 268.587 82.884 131.755 
HighStoverP 832.26 0 - 4.43 2.618 
0.01 - 
3.25 
0.761 0.4 - 1.31 0.744 302.922 89.133 239.109 






1.131 236.529 69.785 79.590 
TvalueErosion 781.70 0 - 3.34 2.702 0.01 - 5 0.981 
0.22 - 
1.06 




























 When considering the benefits of cover crops in Iowa, the difference between 
average profit is $1.45 per acre when comparing the Socially Optimal and the 
NoCoverNoErosionRR scenarios, which means that the incentives to adopt cover crops 
are almost non-existent.  In the NoCoverNoErosionRR scenario, all except one of the soil 
types is harvesting at the medium harvest rate resulting in a 21% increase in area (5.1 
million additional acres) over the Socially Optimal scenario.  The absence of cover crops 
affected the quantity of stover that was harvestable.  When analyzing the effects of cover 
crops on the distribution of profits for these scenarios (Figure 1-5), some soil types will 
have lower profits than the socially optimal case.  The difference in profits is threefold 
and can be attributed to both the decrease in replacement costs, the decrease in stover 
available and the increase in harvested biomass area.  The spatial differences in erosion 
rates between these two scenarios can be seen in Figure 1-1and Figure 1-7. 
 
Figure 1-5: Distribution of Profits for the Scenarios NoCoverNoErosionRR, Socially 






 One of the concerns of not using conservation management (cover crops, 
conservation tillage, barrier strips), while incentivizing the stover market, is the increase 
in potential erosion and the decline in soil quality.  From a profitability standpoint, 
following the non-binding USDA guidelines will result greater profits (TvalueErosion) 
than in the NoCoverNoErosionRR scenario (both scenarios have no internal cost for 
erosion).  For both scenarios, 30.32 million acres are harvested.  In terms of soil 
displacement, the TvalueErosion results in approximately 211.6 million tons (210.6 
million tons to land with stover removal) and in the NoCoverNoErosionRR scenario, 
displacement is approximately 515.3 million tons for land harvesting stover.  However, 
the potential for stover harvested in the TvalueErosion scenario is 587.68 million tons, 
compared to the 539.1 million tons harvested in the NoCoverNoErosionRR scenario.  
This means that farmers wanting to participate in the stover market would be incentivized 
to use cover crops if their optimal rotation is continuous corn, regardless of internalized 
erosion costs or regulatory constraint.  As an added benefit, total erosion would decrease 
almost threefold.  The amounts of stover harvestable over 30.2 million acres is 
approximately 587.7 million tons for TvalueErosion, and 30.3 million acres harvest 539.1 
million tons of stover, assuming continuous corn in all acres. 
 





 When we consider the spatial aspects of incentivizing different conservation 
practices with the resulting economic gains from additional harvested area, these 
differences become more pronounced.  When comparing this to the outcomes when cover 
crops (NoCoverNoErosionRR) are not used, the spatial outcomes of erosion and harvest 
rates are quite different (Figure 1-7).  Approximately, 26.79 million acres, without the 
use of cover crops are within sustainable erosion limits.  Analyzing the results at the soil 
level, taking away the cost of erosion and not installing cover crops 
(NoCoverNoErosionRR scenario) results in a decrease of approximately 0.29 tons/acre in 
biomass harvested for 78 percent of the soil types, including those that are under USDA 
limits.  Alternatively, for the 12 percent of soil types that see an increase in harvest rates, 
the average additional increase in harvested stover is approximately 2.19 tons/acre.  Both 
effects result in an additional 61 million tons harvested over the Socially Optimal 
scenario.  Comparing Figure 1-6 and Figure 1-8, the increase in harvest rates comes 
mainly from the southern area of the state where in the socially optimal case, very little 
stover if any was being harvested.  When comparing the NoCoverNoErosionRR and the 
TvalueErosion scenarios, the results indicate that almost 99 percent of soil types would 
harvest biomass, at lower harvest rates (Figure 1-5). 
  







Figure 1-8: NoCoverNoErosionRR  Scenario Biomass Harvest Results for Iowa 
 
 From this perspective, the biomass harvested and erosion tradeoffs are going to be 
localized, as opposed to uniform over the supply shed region.  Farmers receive the 
benefits of cover crops in lower rates of erosion and higher rates of stover removal in a 
continuous corn rotation.  Requiring erosion control over the USDA suggested limits and 
the market-based incentives would likely not be needed in the continuous corn rotation 
and will be considered for other rotations in section1.6.7.  If more acres are required or 
higher rates of removal, the biorefinery would need to weigh whether or not the 
additional tonnage harvested or increased participation within the supply shed would 
account for the additional economic costs of incentivizing certain management regimes.  
Although, it is unknown what the true costs to farmers are with respect to erosion, these 
scenarios illustrate the potential outcomes when incentives for environmental 
conservation and harvesting biomass can work together. 
 The potential for environmental damage (Figure 1-11) is considered when farmers 
choose not to use any conservation practice and have low internal erosion costs 
(NoConservation_LowErosionCost).  For Iowa, this could mean that soil erosion rates 





negative SCI values for 95% of the soil types.  Farmers in this scenario are still 
maximizing profits and still choosing a rotation of continuous corn.  Respectively, the 
rate at which biomass is harvested increases substantially throughout the state (Figure 
1-12).  It raises questions of whether harvesting stover without conservation management 
would be sustainable in the long-run for half of the state.  The market, regulation or 
contracts may be needed to incentivize monitoring or alternative practices in these areas 
to ensure sustainable rates of erosion. 
 







Figure 1-10: TvalueScenario Biomass Harvest Results for Iowa 
 







Figure 1-12: NoConservation_LowErosionCost Scenario Biomass Harvest Results for 
Iowa 
 
 Soil characteristics, yields and management practices are the main differences in 
the quantities of stover that are harvestable throughout the state.  Considering these 
differences, a change in the base price for stover may disproportionately alter the size and 
density of the supply shed.  As farmers weigh the tradeoffs with nutrient replacement and 
stewardship activities with the price of stover, some areas may not be as responsive to 
changes in prices with changes in harvested quantities (HighStoverP and LowStoverP).  
In response to a shift in higher prices, ceterus paribus, from $80 to $125 per ton, 82% of 
land in Iowa was perfectly inelastic and harvest rates remained the same, 21% were 
perfectly elastic and harvest rates increased from 0 to an average of 2.56 tons/acre, and 
the remaining 3% were almost unitary elastic (-.89 to -.93).  A downward shift in prices 
results in a different response structure.  A shift from $80 to $34.03 per ton (which 
includes the harvesting costs but not nutrient replacement or erosion costs) results in 21% 
of soil types still harvesting nothing, 34% were inelastic in supply (-0.09 to -0.11) 
resulting in an average decrease of 0.176 tons harvested, and 32% were elastic in supply, 





the adoption of cover crops in these areas that do decide to harvest, as a result of higher 
quantities that are available for harvest. 
1.6.2. Illinois 
 The optimal choice for Illinois, under the Socially Optimal scenario was 
continuous corn, no-tillage, medium residue harvest, 100% rye cover crop, with no 
vegetative barrier for all soil types.  Nineteen percent of the 4469 soil types, or 21.02 
million acres, chose not to harvest any stover and two soil types chose the 60% rye, 40% 
radish cover crop.  Under this scenario, average profit per acre was $710, averaging 2.22 
tons/acre of biomass, and average erosion was 0.496 tons/acre/year.  For those that did 
not harvest, profit averaged $706 and erosion rates averaged 0.48 tons/acre (Table 1-7).  
The Socially Optimal scenario encourages low erosion rates throughout the state, and 
results in 2.6 million tons of soil displacement, with 2.3 million tons attributed to stover 
harvested lands (Figure 1-1).  The quantities of stover harvested in this scenario are 
approximately, 12,032 million tons of stover annually. 
 The comparison between the Socially Optimal and the NoCoverNoErosionRR 
scenarios indicates that the inclusion of cover crops has a significant effect – 4.5 
tons/acre/year on average erosion.  In total, erosion for the NoCoverNoErosionRR 
scenario is estimated to be 26.59 million tons of soil displaced.  The effectiveness of 
cover crops is apparent in the southern counties, where erosion and harvest rates increase 
significantly between these two scenarios.  In areas, that did not harvest stover in the 
Socially Optimal, an increase of 16.3 million tons of soil erosion occurs.  Cover crops 
also led to higher rates of biomass removal in 28% of the soil types.  The difference in 
total quantities of stover removed between these scenarios is an increase 2.77 million tons 
for the NoCoverNoErosionRR scenario.  In the Socially Optimal case, in counties like, 
Carroll (17015) and Woodford (17203), cover crops allow for an additional 0.23 
tons/acre and 024 tons/acre respectively to be harvested sustainably (Figure 1-13).  This 
implies that farmers in these counties will not likely need additional incentives or 





in the stover market.  Between these two scenarios, the use of cover crops increases the 
area in which biomass can be harvested at a higher rate with lower rates of erosion. 
 
 
Figure 1-13: Optimal Scenario Biomass Harvest Results for Illinois 
 
 The comparison between the Socially Optimal and the TvalueErosion scenarios 
indicates that private costs attached to erosion can impact which soil types and farmers 
will be likely to participate in the biomass market.  If farmers see a higher cost of erosion, 
then 13 percent of the state of Illinois will not harvest any biomass.  However, if farmers 
are merely concerned with being compliant with t-values and do not internally reflect 
private costs for erosion, than the area that will harvest stover increases to almost 100% 
percent of the state.  The amount of soil that is displaced in the TvalueErosion scenario is 
approximately 5.04 million tons/year, with 2.6 million ton increase over the Socially 
Optimal scenario coming from the 3.08 million acres that would choose to harvest and 





Table 1-7: Selected Estimates from Model Scenarios for Illinois (n = 4485) 
 








































0.741 285.552 84.868 188.566 
NoCover 
NoErosionRR 






0.196 265.769 82.378 135.646 






0.648 299.572 88.407 241.731 
LowStoverP 640.66 0 - 2.93 0.097 0 - 0.86 0.112 
0.58 - 
1.49 
1.047 227.179 66.934 66.352 



































Figure 1-14: NoCoverNoErosionRR Scenario Erosion Results for Illinois 
 





 Areas in the southern counties of the state can minimize the potential for 
environmental damage through the usage of cover crops and by choosing lower harvest 
rates.  These areas are of concern when considering a lack of conservation management, 
as can be seen in the NoCoverNoErosionRR scenario.  For areas that have over 5 
tons/acre/year of erosion in the NoCoverNoErosionRR scenario, the contribution to the 
stover market could potentially be 3.8 million tons of stover, with a respective 20.52 
million tons of erosion.  The southern areas of the state contribute 2.2 million tons of 
stover and 16.4 million tons of erosion to these totals.  In comparison to the 
TvalueErosion scenario these sensitive areas would only contribute 1.45 million tons of 
soil displacement if 100% rye cover crop were used.  Plus, of the 2.1 million acres of 
environmentally sensitive areas, 187,796 acres would not participate in the stover market 
under the TvalueErosion constraints.  Incentives and regulations in this market will have 
the potential to impact land areas in production and the rate that stover could be 
harvested. 
 






Figure 1-17: Tvalue Scenario Biomass Harvest Results for Illinois 
  
 Although the NoConservation_LowErosionCost scenario represents an extreme 
case, the potential for incentivizing stover removal in these sensitive areas without 
ensuring conservation practices, will have significant environmental effects.  These areas 
that have erosion rates over 10 tons/acre/year (which ends up being 42% of the state) 
have the potential to contribute 9.8 million tons of biomass but disproportionately add 
over 61.1 million tons of erosion, without conservation management practices.  For the 
same region, in the TvalueErosion scenario, the contribution of biomass is 7.8 million 
tons with an erosion potential of 14.6 million tons of soil displacement.  For the areas of 
the state that would still be sustainable (under 5 tons /acre/year of erosion), 10.3 million 
acres would be able to supply 6.517 million tons of stover annually.  However, 8.9 
million acres report a negative SCI, which means that even though erosion thresholds are 
under recommended limits, soil organic matter would still be at risk for degradation.  





TvalueErosion and the NoConservation_LowErosionCost scenario, the difference in 
positive and negative SCI through the practice of cover crops and no-till conservation, is 
approximately 1.57 million tons of stover.    
 






Figure 1-19: NoConservation_LowErosionCost Scenario Biomass Harvest Results for 
Illinois 
 As farmers weigh the tradeoffs with nutrient replacement and stewardship 
activities with the price of stover, some areas may not be as responsive to changes in 
prices with changes in harvested quantities (HighStoverP and LowStoverP).  In response 
to a shift in higher prices, ceterus paribus, from $80 to $125 per ton, 67% of land in 
Illinois was perfectly inelastic and harvest rates remained the same, 19% were perfectly 
elastic and harvest rates increased from 0 to an average of 2.72 tons/acre and the 
remaining 12% were almost unitary elastic (-.88 to -.97).  A downward shift in prices 
results in a different response structure.  A shift from $80 to $34.03 per ton (which 
includes the harvesting costs but not nutrient replacement or erosion costs) results in 19% 
soil types being perfectly inelastic and harvest rates did not change from harvesting 
nothing, 80% were inelastic in supply (-0.09 to -0.13) resulting in an average decrease of 






 The optimal choice for all soil types for management under this scenario was 
continuous corn, no-tillage, medium residue harvest, 100% rye cover crop, with no 
vegetative barrier for all soil types.  Under this scenario, average profit per acre was 
$668, averaging 2.05 tons/acre of biomass, and average erosion was 0.42 tons/acre/year.  
The significant result of this case is the overall low level of erosion from the adoption of 
cover crops and no-till for most areas of the state (Figure 1-1).  For 14.9 million acres 
that would harvest stover, the erosion potential is 51.6 million tons of soil per year with 
308.78 million tons of stover harvested.  The 3.6 million acres that choose not to harvest 
in the optimal scenario have erosion rates under 0.13 tons/acre and result in 
approximately 11.43 million tons of soil displaced. 
 The contribution of conservation through the use of cover crops is significant for 
several areas within the state.  Under the NoCoverNoErosionRR scenario, the average 
amount of erosion increased 5.4 tons/acre/year, though the upward bound on erosion 
increased from 1.72 tons/acre to 74.5 tons/acre.  The net soil erosion for the state under 
this scenario is 881.08 million tons of displaced soil.  Biomass totals for the state increase 
to 409 million tons of stover harvested annually.  Farmers in this scenario still have the 
option of adopting no-till and vegetative barrier strips, though none chose to adopt 
vegetative barrier strips.  The 3.6 million acres that were not producing in the Socially 
Optimal scenario (Figure 1-2) produce 101.22 million tons of stover with 603.6 million 
tons of soil displaced through erosion.  The same area, under the TvalueErosion scenario 
has the potential to produce 74.7 million tons of biomass and displace 87.8 million tons 
of soil.  These are areas in which a market for stover has the highest potential in Indiana 
to create negative environmental externalities.  When considering whether or not a 
market would incentivize the usage of cover crops, consider that average profits for this 
scenario was $27 less than the Socially Optimal scenario; which is less than the costs of 





Table 1-8: Selected Estimates From Model Scenarios For Indiana (Soil types = 2941) 
 


































Socially Optimal 668.88 0 - 3 2.054 
0.01 - 
1.72 










0.046 256.991 80.064 135.158 
HighStoverP 767.89 0 - 4.51 2.495 0.01 - 3.2 0.642 
0.37 - 
1.08 
0.651 283.940 84.267 216.418 
LowStoverP 606.49 0 - 2.8 0.190 0 - 1.29 0.129 
0.58 - 
1.45 
0.992 220.933 65.322 70.037 
TvalueErosion 724.32 0 - 3 2.543 
0.01 - 
4.99 




























Therefore, the profit incentive may be there for several areas of the state, but when the 
difference in profit is less than the cost of using a cover crop, farmers may forgo the 
environmental benefits to gain economic ones, at least in the short-run.  Biomass is also 
harvested from 873,899 acres that have erosion rates above the 5 tons/acre threshold that 
were sustainably producing stover in the TvalueErosion and Socially Optimal scenarios.  
These areas may need either the regulatory enforcement or other incentives to ensure that 
erosion rates can remain within sustainable limits and that cover crops are part of the 
management strategy. 
 
Figure 1-20: NoCoverNoErosionRR Scenario Erosion Results 
 
 Under the NoConservation_LowErosionCost scenario, average erosion increases 
to over 14 ton/acre/year.  The amount of soil displaced in this extreme scenario is 2.11 





every soil type, not practicing conservation management, results in lower stover 
harvested and lower profits than under the TvalueErosion scenario.  This is in part due to 
87% of the soil types adopting a higher harvest removal rate, thus increasing costs of 
nutrient replacement.  Alternatively, with erosion replacement costs being high 
(NoConservation_HighErosionCost), erosion averages 3.98 tons/acre/year but biomass 
removal decreases to the no harvest removal rate for 5% of the soils.  One of the 
conclusions of these results is that farmer behavior will depend on perceived costs of 
erosion and erosion prevention measures and how the outcomes affect stover harvested.  
For the cases in which farmers must pay the erosion costs via nutrient replacement, they 
typically adopted no-till or cover crops to prevent erosion, in some soils regardless of the 
stover market.  For the cases in which we forced no erosion reduction practices, erosion 
increased substantially (Figure1-21).  These cases are a proxy for the farmer either not 
perceiving erosion costs as real or perceiving the costs of erosion prevention as being 
high or some combination of the two.  Under the NoConservation_LowErosionCost 
scenario, 5.9 million acres have the potential to harvest 142.6 million tons of stover, 
under sustainable erosion limits.  Of these totals, adding in a sustainability factor for soil 
organic matter decreases the acreage to 1.3 million acres and a total of 22.43 million tons 
of biomass.  These acres displace of 13.4 million tons of soil, which is a significantly 






Figure1-21: No Erosion Costs or Conservation Management (NoConservation_ 
HighErosionCost) Scenario Erosion Results 
 Several areas of the state would benefit from conservation management strategies.  
When considering the TvalueErosion scenario, harvest rates range throughout the state as 
much as the Socially Optimal case, erosion rates are under 5 tons/ acre/year and profits 
are $55 greater on average.  In both cases, soil types were practicing 100% rye cover 
crops.  There were also 18,204 acres choosing to install vegetative barriers in addition to 
the cover crop in order to meet the erosion threshold and to harvest biomass at a medium 
high harvest rate.  These acres choose not to harvest any stover in the Socially Optimal 
case.  From an environmental perspective if there is an enforceable limit to erosion, 
farmers will weigh the additional benefits of each practice with their respective costs and 






 The optimal choice for a majority of soil types for management under the Socially 
Optimal scenario was continuous corn, no-tillage, medium residue harvest, 100% rye 
cover crop, with no vegetative barrier for all soil types.  Only 2 percent of the soil types 
choose not to harvest any stover at the socially optimal rates.  Under this scenario, 
average profit per acre was $844, averaging 2.8 tons/acre of biomass, and average erosion 
was 0.28 tons/acre/year.  For this scenario 23.3 million acres harvest 68.43 million tons 
of biomass.  The erosion outcome for this scenario is 8.13 million tons of soil displaced.  
In the TvalueErosion scenario, 660,804 more acres enter the stover market, producing 70 
million tons of biomass, eroding 9.23 million tons of soil.  It is important to note, that one 
of the significant benefits of stover in Nebraska is its contribution to moisture 
management in the soil, which is not captured in these integrated models.  Also, these 
models do not differentiate irrigated land.  Both need to be considered in future work. 
 In the extreme case (NoConservation_LowErosionCost), there are 23.98 million 
acres that harvest 72.68 million tons of biomass.  Similar to the outcomes of the other 
states, the increases in erosion is substantial, as 206.43 million tons of soil are displaced.  
In terms of land that can still be sustainably harvested for stover in this scenario, 
approximately 10.6 million acres could contribute 25.49million tons of biomass.  Though 
given the low density to area harvest rates, a market for stover without conservation 
management would be limited.  When considering aggregation potential with other states 
in the sample, these acres are on the western side of the state, and it may not be 
economically feasible to transport quantities of stover over that significant of a distance.  
The western half of the state, measuring 200 miles from the western border, contains 8.9 
million acres of land, which can produce upwards of 20.9 million tons of biomass in the 
NoConservation_LowErosionCost scenario.  If we impose sustainability constraints on 
erosion, then this area can sustainability harvest 16.06 million tons of biomass without 






Table 1-9: Selected Estimates from Model Scenarios for Nebraska (Soil types =2980) 
 




































768.92 1.92 - 3.52 2.654 0.01 - 64.21 1.347 
-4.73 - 
0.85 
0.511 281.608 86.664 138.395 
HighStoverP 976.08 0 - 3.95 2.956 0 - 2.66 0.326 0.4 - 1.15 0.760 322.194 96.833 197.094 
LowStoverP 726.98 0 - 3.33 2.045 0 - 0.7 0.126 0.6 - 1.57 0.877 296.765 89.188 139.592 




484.68 0 - 3.91 0.662 0.02 - 16.43 1.605 
-0.81 - 
0.94 




651.86 0 - 4.69 3.011 0.05 - 47.54 8.017 
-3.67 - 
0.64 








If we further constrain this area with a positive SCI metric, then the contribution to the 
stover market decreases to 14.8 million tons of stover. 
 
Figure 1-22: NoConservation_LowErosionCost Scenario Erosion Results for Nebraska 
 
 When considering the motivations for cover crop usage in the state, the 
NoCoverNoErosionRR scenario, the average profit is significantly lower than both the 
TvalueErosion and the Socially Optimal scenario.  Biomass supplied in this scenario on 
the 23.9 million acres, is approximately 63.14 million tons of biomass.  The contribution 
of cover crops allows for roughly 6.9 million more tons of biomass to be harvested.  In 
addition, 1.9 million tons are supplied at unsustainable rates of erosion.  The addition of 
cover crops and a decrease in harvest rates in the TvalueErosion scenario decreases the 
amount of soil displaced to 9.23 million tons of soil and increases the amount of biomass 
harvested to 70 million tons.  The difference in harvest rates can be seen in Figure 1-23 
and Figure 1-24, where the difference is in the tradeoffs between intensifying harvest 







Figure 1-23: TvalueErosion Scenario Biomass Results for Nebraska 
 
 







 The optimal choice for a majority of soil types for management under the socially 
optimal scenario was continuous corn, no-tillage, medium residue harvest, 100% rye 
cover crop, with no vegetative barrier for all soil types.  Two of the 3861 soil types chose 
not to harvest any stover.  Under this scenario, average profit per acre was $802, 
averaging 2.8 tons/acre of biomass, and average erosion was 0.28 tons/acre/year.  For this 
scenario 29 million acres have the potential to harvest approximately 122.647 million 
tons of biomass.  Erosion in the Socially Optimal scenario is approximately 12 million 
tons of soil.  The outcomes for the TvalueErosion scenario are similar with 122.78 
million tons of biomass harvested with a net erosion outcome of 12.11 million tons of soil 
displaced.  These results are indicative that the internal costs of soil erosion in Minnesota 
may have little impact on the sustainability outcomes or management choices above those 
which are required by the USDA.  A majority of the acres that are unaffected by soil 
erosion costs are also those that grow limited amounts of corn grain.  This will become 
more apparent in the following section on land use and rotations. 
 Unlike other states in this analysis, the addition of cover crops, changes in 
conservation practices and private costs to erosion do very little to the amount of erosion 
throughout the state.  Considering the differences between Figure 1-25, and Figure 1-27, 
the rates of erosion are all under 5 tons/acre, regardless of the amount of stover removed.  
One could infer that erosion will not be an issue for biomass removed in this state.  Even 
under the scenario where private costs to erosion are low and no conservation is 
practiced, most of the state falls under sustainable erosion limits to removal.  As such, we 
assume that farmers will be profit maximizers and choose cover crops only as a means to 
higher amounts of biomass available to harvest.  Another non-market factor to consider in 
this region is the time required to plant and kill cover crops and the amount of days 
available for planting grain.  The higher latitudes are often concerned with early spring 
planting and the thawing of ground.  If cover crops affect the length of time that it takes 
for the ground to thaw, then the result that erosion rates change very little will dissuade 





Table 1-10: Selected Estimates from Model Scenarios for Minnesota (Soil Types = 3861) 
 
































Socially Optimal 802.20 0 - 3.17 2.830 0 - 1.93 0.278 0.56 - 1.24 0.786 309.155 93.271 184.649 
NoCover 
NoErosionRR 
735.74 1.72 - 2.93 2.550 0 - 5.99 0.664 0.14 - 0.81 0.588 272.374 83.971 133.474 
HighStoverP 929.65 2.04 - 3.17 2.833 0 - 2.52 0.280 0.56 - 1.03 0.785 309.269 93.298 185.030 
LowStoverP 681.80 0 - 3.02 2.113 0 - 0.85 0.166 0.57 - 1.63 0.864 289.371 87.123 145.227 








632.62 1.51 - 4.34 3.261 
0.04 - 
30.46 









Figure 1-25: NoCoverNoErosionRR Scenario Erosion Results for Minnesota 
 






Figure 1-27: T-Value Scenario Erosion Results for Minnesota 
 






1.6.6. Land Availability 
 One of the limiting factors that need to be considered is the current rotations of 
farm land in the supply shed.  While the main conclusions of the first chapter is that 
farmers will choose to practice continuous corn in order to maximize the amount of 
yearly profit that can be gained in the corn grain-stover optimization.  However, with the 
uncertainties in the marketplace the current decisions in regards to the corn-soybean 
rotation may further limit the amount of acreage available in any given year for the 
harvest of stover.  When considering current rotations (Figure 1-29), the amount of land 
available for corn stover may further increase or decrease depending on price fluctuations 
for these commodities.  Comparing the 2010-2012 crop rotations (Figure 1-29), to the 
rotations from 2008-2010 (Figure 1-30), more land has transitioned into continuous corn 
and into a corn-corn-soybean rotation.  These changes in intensification of production 
have an impact on the farmer’s decision making process when it comes to harvesting 
stover, choosing optimal management and conservation strategies, and in terms of the 
supply density, depth and fluctuations in the local stover market. 
  In addition, extensive production may have implications on what kind of spot 
market may be available in years when droughts, floods and other conditions may affect 
the amounts of actual stover in the field.  Though there would be no guarantee that these 
areas could ensure sustainability in harvesting stover, as a spot market would not 
necessarily induce the usage of conservation tillage or cover crops.  Areas indicated in 
yellow transition from other crops, such as hay, alfalfa and pasture to corn and soybean 
rotations, but may return to these alternative crops so their long-run usage is tentative.  
Additionally, these expansions may be temporary given the proclivity of some of these 
areas to be classified as highly erodible without conservation (Figure 1-3) or flood prone.  
The intensive and extensive changes over time will have implications, not only for farmer 
decision making, but also for the stover market, as stover available will ebb along with 







































Acreage – Rotation 2008-10   
Iowa 4493 1,707,882 10,837,425 4,061,011 
Illinois 4485 2,056,332 7,747,149 3,913,787 
Indiana 2941 467,853 4,743,731 1,599,717 
Nebraska 2980 1,734,801 3,984,195 2,795,332 
Minnesota 3861 513,436 5,929,995 1,884,811 
Acreage – Rotation 2010-12   
Iowa 4493 1,883,565 11,706,908 4,290,872 
Illinois 4485 2,012,979 9,100,727 4,201,822 
Indiana 2941 483,664 5,040,424 1,526,425 
Nebraska 2980 1,853,688 4,752,635 3,310,408 
Minnesota 3861 615,681 6,577,917 1,987,092 
 
Increases in acreage during these time periods are the result of market prices for both 
corn and soybean, as every state had fluctuations in land within a continuous corn or corn 
and soybean rotation scheme.  Assuming a fixed area for a supply shed, these subtle 
effects on land in these rotations will affect the planning decisions and the lengths of 
contracts.  Producers may adjust the amount of stover harvested based on these crop 
rotations, as some crop rotations may be more or less prone to stover accumulation or 
alternatively require more land preparation with greater potential for erosion concerns.  
For example, assuming all else equal, if land shifts from continuous corn to corn-
soybeans, a farmer in Iowa could shift from harvesting an average of 2.702 in continuous 
corn (Table 1-6) 1.60 in corn-soybean rotation (Table 1-12) in tons/acre of biomass. This 
decrease in stover harvested can be attributed to the change in profitability between 
rotations and the difference in benefits for managements in the different rotations. 
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The acreage counts in Table 1-11 are approximates and vary slightly in comparison to the USDA 
estimates for crops in any given year and the USDA doesn’t report acreage in different rotation schemes 






Table 1-12: Selected Estimates from the T-value Erosion Model Scenarios Setting Crop Rotation to Corn-Soybean 
 



































Iowa 260.67 0 - 2.19 1.60 
0.02 - 
7.95 
2.94 0 - 0.54 0.18 236.08 106.73 158.15 
Illinois 
260.67 0 - 2.19 1.60 0.02 - 
7.95 
2.94 0 - 0.54 0.18 236.08 106.73 158.15 
Indiana  
235.95 0 - 2.13 1.47 
0.03 - 
7.96 
2.63 0 - 0.55 0.21 225.06 101.83 149.16 
Minnesota 
272.99 0 - 2.2 1.64 0 - 5 1.88 
-0.3 - 
0.66 
0.28 234.81 107.67 161.27 
Nebraska 123.66 
0 - 2.4 1.40 0.01 - 5 1.19 -0.28 - 
0.7 











In comparison to the continuous corn outcomes from the previous section, the amount of 
biomass harvested is on average much lower, as many areas choose not to harvest. A 
direct result of this is also lower rates of soil erosion.  Returning, to the idea that land 
availability and rotations will constrain market development, then prices and incentives 
may need to reflect these differences.  If farmers are unwilling to switch to a continuous-
corn rotation, the profit motives of the stover market may be less attractive as farmers 
capitalize the benefits of stover harvest over the time of crop rotation.  Biorefineries and 
upstream participants may need to look at larger supply areas in order to meet the supply 
needs at the refinery, if prices and other incentives are not flexible.  Farmers in different 
rotations will also react differently to incentives based on erosion control, cover crops or 
harvesting thresholds.  In addition, this result will affect the length of time that farmers 
and refineries may choose to contract for stover,  as profits and erosion costs are adjusted 
over the time of the rotation and the benefits of harvesting stover only occur in years 
where corn is the rotated crop. 
 Although there are several soil types that would have low erosion rates, the 
incidences of high yields, and crop rotations may also affect the ideal location of the 
biorefinery.  The analysis that has been undertaken with these scenarios assumes that 
farmers can freely choose the best management options and where stover markets exist, 
farmers for the most part would shift to a continuous corn rotation.  However, the 
outcomes of the optimization become inherently more interesting when considering that a 
market for stover may not actually incentivize different rotations through the Corn Belt.  
In terms of adoption of cover crops, the choice of 100% rye cover crop is no longer the 
default choice, as the fraction of total soil types decreases (Table 1-13).  The adoption of 
a 100% rye cover cropping system decreases significantly, depending on state and soil 
type.  Considering the USDA t-value, if this policy is binding, farmers, biorefineries or 
government have little incentive to increase conservation measures above limits already 
established.  As such it may not be efficient to incentivize one type of conservation 
management, as the decreases in erosion may overshoot this threshold for certain soil 
types and rotations.  Additionally as farmers weigh the costs and benefits of the different 





spur their adoption.  Even though typically, these areas choose not to adopt cover crops 
which results in a decrease in the amount of stover harvested.  There is also a greater 
variation in the harvest rates. In several soil types it is no longer economically viable to 
harvest stover in the socially optimal case. 
Table 1-13: Management and Conservation Practices for Corn-Soybean Rotations 
Practice Iowa Illinois Indiana Minnesota Nebraska 
Number of Soil Types 4493 4469 2874 3859 2908 
NCC 0.65 0.62 0.64 0.88 0.82 
100rye 0.35 0.38 0.35 0.12 0.17 
40rye, 60clover 0 0 0 0 0 
60rye, 40radish 0 0.002 0 0.005 0.04 
RT 0 0 0 0 0 
NT 1 1 1 1 1 
NRH 0.95 0.19 0.89 0.61 0.50 
MRH 0 0 0.002 0 0.001 
MHH 0.01 0.81 0.03 0.31 0.46 
HRH 0.04 0 0.08 0.08 0.06 
NVB 1 1 0.94 1 1 
SVB 0 0 0.06 0 0 
  
 Additional constraints to land availability are with the presence of drought and 
resulting yield drags.  Although there is no way to fully predict the causes of yield drag, 
we proxy the effects of a 8 and 12 bushel per acre yield drag to see if there are any 
underlying changes to the optimal scenarios for the states, reverting back to a majority of 
soil types moving to continuous corn.  The results can be found in Table 1-14 and show 
that under conditions where there may be some yield drag farmers would still choose a 
medium harvest rate, a continuous corn-rotation and participate in the stover market.  
Farmers may also find additional incentives in participating in the stover market as a 
means to compensate from lower incomes from grain harvested, unless the stover 







Table 1-14: Selected Estimates from Model Scenarios Setting Yield Drag 
  Average 












8/bu/ac        
 Iowa 718.63 0.492 2.077 0.812 286.496 84.879 185.382 
 Illinois 703.17 0.498 2.080 0.727 283.176 83.956 185.546 
 Indiana 618.88 0.428 1.936 0.712 259.174 77.475 167.599 
 Nebraska 841.49 0.289 2.732 0.762 317.273 95.264 184.783 
 Minnesota 799.18 0.293 2.705 0.768 307.185 92.452 182.540 
12/bu/ac        
 Iowa 716.77 0.494 2.008 0.805 285.118 84.377 183.300 
 Illinois 701.31 0.497 2.004 0.722 281.607 83.403 182.847 
 Indiana 593.67 0.434 1.878 0.705 252.644 75.575 165.240 
 Nebraska 840.01 0.295 2.670 0.754 316.269 94.853 183.621 
 Minnesota 797.64 0.302 2.644 0.758 306.263 92.056 181.719 
 
1.6.7. Sustainability 
 Defining the sustainability criteria of stover harvesting has several factors that 
need to be considered.  As stated earlier, a greater percentage of stover may be required 
to limit SOC losses, given that carbon turnover in the soil may be a slower process than 
the effects of SOC on erosion (Johnson, et al., 2006, Johnson, et al., 2006, Wilhelm, et 
al., 2007).  Additionally to reiterate, the SCI is a metric that allows for planners to decide 
whether or not a practice is going to degrade the soil, regardless of current soil 
classification.  Therefore, soil types that are degraded but still have a zero or positive SCI 
are assumed not to degrade further. The metric does not place a value on farmers looking 
to improve the soil organic matter through better residue management and use of cover 
crops.  Gauging the benefits of these non-market services would depend on their 
contribution to marketable goods (e.g.  grain and soybeans), their inputs (e.g.  higher 
quality soils need less fertilizer) and the amount of time that would be required to 





medium to long-term outcomes of soil quantity and quality.  We can attempt to distill a 
shadow value on what this metric would mean for farmers in terms of a sustainability 
constrained and unconstrained market.  When considering sustainability, scenarios 
requiring limits on erosion and the SCI metric were undertaken in order to gauge the 
different management strategies and economic outcomes based on land in production and 
rotations. For the analysis, constraints on different metrics of sustainability were 
considered.  
 If policy, markets or contracts further limit the availability of stover supply 
through sustainability constraints on erosion or on the SCI, then it is important to 
illustrate the potential shifts in supply availability.  These constraints have potential 
economic costs associated with each limitation, which are reflected in both the 
profitability to farmers, harvest rates, and management choices.  Assuming a base price 
of $80, four different sensitivity scenarios were undertaken to see how costs and acreages 
would change if farmers were bound by sustainability criteria on erosion and soil quality 
(SCI).These scenarios indicate the potential with and without the consideration of limits 
on soil erosion and soil condition. These scenarios were, 
1. Assuming no internal replacement cost for erosion but the sustainability 
thresholds were constraining (total erosion < 5 tons/acre/year, SCI >0). 
2. Assuming no internal replacement cost for erosion but the sustainability 
thresholds were constraining for just soil organic carbon (SCI >0). 
3. Assuming no internal replacement cost for erosion but constraining total erosion 
(total erosion < 5 tons/acre/year). 
4. Assuming no internal replacement cost for erosion and no sustainability 
thresholds were constraining. 
Assuming that profit is going to be the driving factor in the decision to harvest stover, 
some farmers optimal choices may already include the use of conservation management 





have little change in management choices or profits. Alternatively, as requiring stover 
harvesting to be sustainable will change the marginal costs for harvesting stover, some 
farmers will potentially decrease harvested amounts or choose not to participate.  
 Connecting these outcomes with the crop rotations (illustrated in Figure 1-29), 
and ignoring the land that appears in the ‘Corn, at least one year’ category
13
.  We can 
illustrate the areas in which the addition of conservation practices will have economic 
value without necessarily needing further regulatory or contract terms.  Since the first 
scenario, precludes looking at erosion rates, the important factors to consider are going to 
be harvest rates, conservation usage (cover crop choice and vegetative barriers) and 
profitability.  Using the first scenario as a baseline to gauge the cost of relaxing the 
environmental constraints, we can estimate the shadow value of each constraint.  For the 
$80 per ton price for stover, using a corn-soybean rotation, the effects of these 
sustainability constraints on profit can be seen in Figure 1-31.  Soil types in this figure 
have been, ranked by profitability in the most constrained, Scenario 1.  The spatial 
distribution of these outcomes over space will not be as smooth and will need to be 
accounted for within the supply shed and in terms of the changes based on crop rotation. 
 As expected, without an internal cost for erosion, profits for several of the soil 
types increase as the constraints to sustainability are relaxed.  In terms of the outcomes in 
profitability, harvest rates, biomass, erosion and SCI metrics, the descriptive statistics for 
the sustainability scenarios can be found in Table 1-15 to Table 1-18.  This effect for the 
corn-soybean rotation can be contributed to a greater amount of biomass harvested 
(income effect), as well as, through a decrease in costs related to conservation or a 
change in management strategy (substitution effect). However, the differences for 
continuous corn in each state in terms of land, management and intensification were 
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 This land may be transitioned in and out of other sources during the length of the contract and perhaps 
would not be reliable for a contract-based supply chain.  Though opportunities in the spot market may exist 
and it may be possible to harvest stover from these acres, it may not be possible to ensure sustainability in a 





small, as the profitable outcomes for this crop rotation, regardless of the sustainability 
criteria, was the 100% rye cover crop.  The difference in relaxing the sustainability 
constraints had the greatest effect on the corn-soybean rotations in terms of increasing the 
average profit range $87 to $173, whereas, for the more intensive system of corn-corn-
soybeans, relaxing the sustainability criteria ended up decreasing the range of 
profitability from ($47) to ($140).  In the corn-soybean rotations, the change in 
profitability is mainly the effect of higher harvest rates and on average the opposite is 
true in the corn-corn-soybean rotation.  In terms of rates of erosion, in all scenarios the 







Figure 1-31Profit Response to Sustainability Constraints in a Corn-Soybean Rotation 
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CB 780.68 0 - 3.34 2.69 0.01 - 4.96 0.98 
0.22 - 
1.06 
0.71 292.43 89.68 141.71 
CB,SB 292.79 0 - 2.31 1.49 0.02 - 5 2.90 0 - 0.72 0.24 233.51 111.71 164.63 
CB,CG,SB 366.66 0 - 3.17 2.26 0.02 - 5 2.63 0 - 0.91 0.28 248.97 179.67 236.00 
IL 
CB 767.48 0 - 3.1 2.67 0.01 - 4.99 0.91 
0.22 - 
1.09 
0.65 289.09 88.73 140.40 
CB,SB 259.95 0 - 1.54 1.54 0 - 2.77 2.77 0 - 0.21 0.21 235.20 106.28 155.91 
CB,CG,SB 347.95 0 - 2.99 2.20 0.02 - 5 2.65 0 - 0.71 0.23 247.31 172.86 223.22 
IN 
CB 724.32 0 - 3 2.54 0.01 - 4.99 0.92 
0.2 - 
1.03 
0.63 277.43 85.33 134.28 
CB,SB 234.65 0 - 1.47 1.47 0 - 2.48 2.48 0 - 0.22 0.22 225.28 101.97 149.34 
CB,CG,SB 323.96 0 - 2.9 2.20 0.04 - 5 2.35 0 - 0.51 0.24 240.18 167.41 217.57 
MN 
CB 825.57 2.04 - 3.17 2.83 0 - 2.52 0.28 
0.56 - 
1.03 
0.79 304.79 93.28 148.27 
CB,SB 273.76 0 - 1.62 1.62 0 - 1.75 1.75 0 - 0.3 0.30 234.56 107.71 160.84 
CB,CG,SB 348.09 0 - 3.02 2.33 0 - 5 1.59 0 - 0.74 0.33 246.51 172.29 226.78 
NE 
CB 871.23 2.11 - 3.51 2.94 0 - 4.65 0.33 
0.29 - 
1.15 
0.76 316.96 96.78 153.83 
CB,SB 123.37 0 - 1.54 1.39 0 - 2.77 1.14 0 - 0.21 0.42 237.83 80.87 106.96 







    
 
































CB 787.07 1.86-3.34 2.74 0.01-7.14 1.01 0.11-1.03 0.71 294.67 90.37 143.65 
CB,SB 295.84 0-2.31 1.61 0.02-7.17 3.15 0-0.6 0.20 236.39 112.72 168.91 
CB,CG,SB 373.00 0-3.17 2.44 0.02-7.65 2.89 0-0.58 0.24 254.47 182.21 243.12 
IL 
CB 768.56 0-3.1 2.70 0.01-7.35 0.98 0.01-0.94 0.64 289.75 88.96 141.37 
CB,SB 260.67 0-1.6 1.60 0-2.94 2.94 0-0.18 0.18 236.08 106.73 158.15 
CB,CG,SB 351.26 0-2.99 2.33 0.02-7.31 2.83 0-0.51 0.20 250.52 174.43 228.33 
IN 
CB 727.28 2.01-3 2.61 0.01-15.12 1.07 -0.58-0.92 0.61 278.98 85.87 136.49 
CB,SB 235.95 0-1.47 1.47 0-2.63 2.63 0-0.21 0.21 225.06 101.83 149.16 
CB,CG,SB 325.18 0-2.92 2.25 0.04-7.23 2.52 0-0.51 0.22 241.16 167.83 219.27 
MN 
CB 825.57 2.04-3.17 2.83 0-2.52 0.28 0.56-1.03 0.79 304.79 93.28 148.27 
CB,SB 273.88 0-1.62 1.62 0-1.78 1.78 0-0.29 0.29 234.61 107.71 160.95 
CB,CG,SB 348.31 1.07-3.02 2.34 0-6 1.65 0-0.61 0.33 246.56 172.28 226.89 
NE 
CB 871.23 2.11-3.51 2.94 0-4.65 0.33 0.29-1.15 0.76 316.96 96.78 153.83 
CB,SB 123.61 0-1.6 1.40 0-2.94 1.19 0-0.18 0.41 238.12 80.94 107.27 








    
 





































CB 781.77 0-3.34 2.70 0.01-5.02 0.98 0.22-1.06 0.71 292.81 89.79 142.03 
CB,SB 260.67 0-2.19 1.60 0.02-7.95 2.94 0-0.54 0.18 236.08 106.73 158.15 
CB,CG,SB 367.13 0-3.17 2.25 0.02-5 2.78 -0.3-0.91 0.26 248.59 179.47 235.68 
IL 
CB 761.07 0-3.1 2.60 0.01-4.99 0.91 0.22-1.09 0.65 286.61 87.94 137.91 
CB,SB 260.67 0-1.6 1.60 0-2.94 2.94 0-0.18 0.18 236.08 106.73 158.15 
CB,CG,SB 349.07 0-2.99 2.20 0.02-5 2.79 -0.3-0.71 0.21 247.21 172.82 223.11 
IN 
CB 724.32 0-3 2.54 0.01-4.99 0.92 0.2-1.03 0.63 277.43 85.33 134.28 
CB,SB 235.95 0-1.47 1.47 0-2.63 2.63 0-0.21 0.21 225.06 101.83 149.16 
CB,CG,SB 325.13 0-2.9 2.20 0.04-5 2.51 -0.34-0.5 0.23 240.08 167.36 217.46 
MN 
CB 825.57 2.04-3.17 2.83 0-2.52 0.28 0.56-1.03 0.79 304.79 93.28 148.27 
CB,SB 272.99 0-1.64 1.64 0-1.88 1.88 0-0.28 0.28 234.81 107.67 161.27 
CB,CG,SB 349.08 0-3.02 2.34 0-5 1.83 -0.29-0.74 0.29 246.53 172.26 227.13 
NE 
CB 871.23 2.11-3.51 2.94 0-4.65 0.33 0.29-1.15 0.76 316.96 96.78 153.83 
CB,SB 123.66 0-1.6 1.40 0-2.94 1.19 0-0.18 0.41 237.97 80.92 107.16 








    
 




































CB 787.07 1.86-3.34 2.74 0.01-7.14 1.01 0.11-1.03 0.71 294.67 90.37 143.65 
CB,SB 398.84 1.7-3.07 2.57 0.23-270.66 12.31 -20.97-0.4 (0.58) 258.43 184.10 248.24 
CB,CG,SB 319.47 1.27-2.3 1.92 0.06-210.74 8.57 -16.25-0.42 (0.29) 247.13 116.39 180.57 
IL 
CB 768.72 2.17-3.1 2.70 0.01-7.65 0.98 -0.01-0.94 0.64 289.81 88.98 141.44 
CB,SB 375.79 2.05-2.9 2.55 0.39-172.02 10.08 -13.19-0.38 (0.44) 256.24 177.25 236.86 
CB,CG,SB 283.21 0-1.91 1.91 0-7.83 7.83 0--0.26 (0.26) 245.01 110.07 169.69 
IN 
CB 727.28 2.01-3 2.61 0.01-15.12 1.07 -0.58-0.92 0.61 278.98 85.87 136.49 
CB,SB 346.60 1.86-2.84 2.45 0.58-154.82 12.99 -11.87-0.36 (0.68) 245.50 169.52 226.18 
CB,CG,SB 253.56 0-1.83 1.83 0-9.84 9.84 0--0.43 (0.43) 234.71 104.96 161.63 
MN 
CB 825.57 2.04-3.17 2.83 0-2.52 0.28 0.56-1.03 0.79 304.79 93.28 148.27 
CB,SB 361.43 1.62-2.93 2.49 0.04-166.65 11.80 -12.76-0.44 (0.55) 249.60 173.48 232.03 
CB,CG,SB 271.27 0-1.86 1.86 0-8.26 8.26 0--0.27 (0.27) 238.62 107.92 166.47 
NE 
CB 871.23 2.11-3.51 2.94 0-4.65 0.33 0.29-1.15 0.76 316.96 96.78 153.83 
CB,SB 296.87 1.19-3.18 2.52 0.01-425.96 42.96 -33.19-0.75 (2.98) 259.45 152.40 190.84 






    
 
 Putting these results in terms of spatial outcomes, the changes in erosion from the 
most constrained case (Scenario 1) to the least constrained (Scenario 4) there are 
differences in terms of cover crop choices, erosion and biomass harvested.  These 
differences in erosion can be seen in Figure and Figure 1-33.  The total amount of erosion 
that is created in the most constrained scenario is 248.89 million tons/year; in the least 
constrained scenario soil displacement through erosion is estimated to be 99.6 million 
tons of soil displaced.  With harvest rates, the difference between these scenarios can be 
found in Figure 1-34 and Figure 1-35.  For example, in areas of Western Illinois, not 
having sustainability constraints leads to more acres harvesting biomass.  In areas of 
eastern Nebraska this relaxation translates to higher rates of harvest.  In 56% of the land, 
there is no change in harvest rates.  In 25%, the shift to the less constrained scenario 
decreased harvest rates.  And in the remaining 19%, the shift resulted in an increase in 
stover harvested.  The importance of these shifts is again going to play into the local 
supply shed dynamics. 
 In comparison to the, NoConservation_LowErosionCost, there are regions in 
which even without additional constraints the least constrained scenario can produce a 
sustainable biomass market, in terms of erosion.  There are approximately 32.9 million 
acres of land that can be sustainably harvested without the additional constraints.  This 
area produces 75.7 million tons of biomass on a three-year planning horizon.  The 
breakdown of these numbers can be found in Table 1-19. 
Table 1-19: Harvesting in the Least Constrained Sustainability Scenario and Still Meeting 
Sustainability Thresholds 
Rotation Acres Biomass Erosion 
Corn-Soybean 21,219,505 42,806,537 51,858,089 
Corn-Corn-
Soybean 
5,625,631 15,250,472 15,845,728 
Continuous 
Corn 
6,067,281 17,691,849 87,346,429 







































































The differences in areas that can be sustainable harvested and areas in which relaxing the 
constraints will lead to erosion rates increasing and soil organic matter to decline can be 
found in Figure 1-37.  These are areas that may need to be targeted for specific 
conservation activities, and would potentially be more efficient in terms of incentivizing 
these practices. 
 When looking at the differences between optimal strategies in the constrained and 
unconstrained outcomes, there are a few key conclusions.  Much like the state-by-state 
results, the continuous corn rotation optimal strategy is the 100% rye cover crop at the 
$80/ton stover price.  The combination of cover crop and harvest rate is both the 
economical and environmentally best outcome.  For the other rotations, in the constrained 
scenario, the choice of cover crop varies between 100% rye, 60/40 rye, radish and no 
cover crop (Figure 1-36).  When the sustainability constraints are relaxed the choice for 
these other rotations defaults to no cover crop used.  When considering the acreage 
dimension, the results based on rotation and cover for the constrained scenario can be 
found in Table 1-20. The difference between the constrained and unconstrained scenario 
is the addition of 4.03 million acres in corn-corn-soybean; a decrease of 298,996 acres in 
corn-soybean; and a decrease of 484 acres in continuous corn. In the scenario of relaxed 
sustainability, all of the acres in corn-corn-soybean and corn-soybean do not practice a 
cover crop. The acres in continuous corn remain (less the 484) in 100% rye and in 60/40 
rye, radish.  
Table 1-20: Acres by Cover Crop Regime and Rotation 
Cover 
Rotation  
Total in Cover 
Corn-Corn-Soybean Corn-Soybean Continuous Corn 
100% Rye 2,858,664 473,307 6,064,614 9,396,585 
60/40 Rye, Radish 3,228,172 7,213,568 2,697 10,444,437 
No Cover 3,761,882 26,824,843 - 30,586,725 






 One national policy that could be considered is the subsidization of cover crops as 
a means to ensure that farmers within the market are producing stover sustainably.  
However, given that farmers in many areas benefit from the usage of cover crops, the 
potential subsidy of cover crops may not need to cover the entire price for the cover.  
When analyzing the price that the usage of cover crops would cause farmers to be 
indifferent between using cover crops and not, the median price for the 100% rye cover, 
on a per acre basis was $20.40 and $20.65 for the 60-40 rye radish mix.  The maximum 
for these subsidies, to induce adoption was $36.50 for 100% rye and $26.20 for the 60-40 
rye radish mix.  If the subsidy were based on the area that would adopt the different cover 
crops, than for 100% rye, the average $18.7 would induce adoption for 25% (183,030 
acres) of the land in the sample region. For land that is in 100% rye, 77% of the acres did 
not require a subsidy. These are acres that are typically in continuous corn and would 
choose to practice the cover regardless of the sustainability criteria. For 60/40 rye radish 
mix, the average of $20 would induce the adoption of 25% (2.6 million) of the acres. 
Figure indicates the distribution of the subsidy based on acreage. However, these 
averages based on the entire sample area are useful for national policy in terms of 
increasing cover crop usage. Chapter 2 considers a more targeted approach that may not 
need as costly subsidies to meet sustainability goals in localized markets.  
 Policies may be more effective in targeting regions or rotations where erosion 
efforts are going to have the highest impact, than creating a singular policy for the entire 
market.  Locations in which constraining erosion and soil organic matter outcomes are 
going to be the greatest are areas that will alternatively have large negative shadow 
values.  These areas can be seen in Figure 1-38.  Although similar in pattern to the 
regions in which harvesting stover in the unconstrained scenario, the value of these 
constraints varies through the landscape for several reasons, given the costs and benefits 
for using cover crops.  Shadow values in Figure 1-38, which are over the median subsidy 
prices, are gaining economic value at the cost of stewardship.  Farmers in these regions 





















































































































































































The farms that fall within the $0 to $39 categories, deem that the break even costs for 
using a cover crop are not compensated by the biomass removed – either through a 
decrease in harvest rates or through the additional costs in terms of nutrient replacement 
for stover.  As the cost differential increases, farmers reflected in the light blue and green 
(max $80) regions reflect that the costs of compliance are preventing them from entering 
the market.   For areas with larger cost differentials, the decreases in profits for the most 
constrained scenario are a result of less optimal management strategies, not just in 
decreases related to not marketing stover.   
 When considering the larger market, the biorefinery may have several factors to 
consider.  If a soil type or region has the potential to substantially increase erosion runoff 
or the soil carbon sustainability varies significantly dependent on farmer practices, the 
refinery may choose to minimize areas with greater variation in outcomes within the 
supply shed.  Especially if there is a concern over sustainability but not necessarily the 
incentive or regulation structure to enforce sustainability.  There are several aspects to 
consider about including or not including these areas.  Farmers may be willing to bear the 
costs of adopting cover crop practices in these highly erosive areas in order to participate 
in the market or choose to mine their soil resources.  Again farmers potentially weigh 
non-market value of erosion with the market value for stover, as prices and incentives 
change, the optimal choice will change.  From a contracting perspective, setting a 
minimum quantity harvested or a price, farmers will then choose their optimal 
management decision.  If the farmer can meet the terms of the contract without any 
additional management changes (as would be the case of an inelastic supply response) 
then cover crops and conservation may or may not necessarily be used.  From a policy 
point of view, increasing the incentives and offsetting the costs of conservation through 
biomass market may have positive externalities for society, though the costs to regulators 
or the biorefinery will increase by requiring conservation.  Alternatively, encouraging the 
harvesting of corn stover in these sensitive areas, without the sustainability criteria, could 











Securing feedstock supply is critical even prior to the establishment of a biorefinery.  
Biofuel producers locate and secure feedstocks based on estimated supply areas with 
ideally low-cost, high density producing biomass acres, decreasing both transaction and 
transportation costs (Gallagher, et al., 2003, Lambert, et al., 2008).  Once plants decide to 
locate in an area, a supply and distribution system needs to be contracted and 
implemented, implying that the market will be local and specialized.  With an absence of 
spot and futures markets, obtaining a steady supply of feedstocks will involve biofuel 
plants contracting with farmers, or more likely intermediate aggregators, for the tasks of 
production, harvest, storage, and delivery of biomass.  Given the high costs and risks 
associated with building second-generation biorefineries, securing the feedstock supply 
chain commitments is a necessary step before plants break ground.  These biomass 
contracts will probably be multi-year contracts, spanning at least 3 to 5 years in order to 
reduce market risk  (Tyndall, et al., 2011). These contracts will fulfill the expected supply 
needs of the plants while ensuring participation, being incentive compatible and 
renegotiation proof for producers, meaning that after the contract is signed but before 
delivery of the feedstock, the terms of the contract cannot be changed. 
 On the output-side, biorefineries are competing against other sources of energy 
(e.g. gasoline or diesel) in output prices.  As such, profit margins for the bioenergy 
market are likely thin and variable, thus increasing pressure on input costs. Contracts are 





For the biorefinery, the risks lie within the procurement of a steady supply of a single 
feedstock within grades for quality. That is in addition to the other supply-side factors, 
including bulk density, aggregation, and water content, that increase the costs of 
transportation (Thompson and Tyner, 2011).  Biofuel plants may be profitable when 
producing at near capacity, though refineries may evaluate different supply options. 
These options balance just-in-time delivery and the potential for undersupply with the 
costs of storage and managing inventories with the potential for oversupply and 
shutdown; depending on how much of the stover production risk the biorefineries 
undertake.   
 As such, there are several goals that may or may not conflict with decision 
making on farm, as the refinery establishes a low-cost, stable, long-term supply chain. 
The general assumption is that biorefineries will need to use different pricing strategies 
within these contracts as an effective means to, separate farmers in different rotations, 
minimize transportation costs, meet supply and acreage targets, incentivize management 
practices and improve the overall stability of supply. Farmer decision making will center 
on the potential management and harvest choices. The environmental outcomes in terms 
of erosion and soil organic matter, may limit the stover that could be produced on any 
acre.  In order to align these potentially conflicting incentives of the farmers and the goals 
of the biorefinery, several production, harvest and storage activities will need to be 
considered. 
 The first chapter provides context for the farmer decision making process within 
the stover market, at the ground level. The analysis provides bounds to farmer activities 
under different states of nature for the entire five state sample area, assuming a set price 
for stover per ton. The analysis illuminates what the potential supply and environmental 
outcomes could be in absence of competition and alternative pricing options. This 
Chapter transitions from this wide perspective of stover supply in the Corn Belt, to the 
potential tradeoffs for the fuel sheds and considers different price options as the 
biorefineries aggregate supply. These price options were inspired through the lens of 





based pricing options.  The analysis does not cover the breadth of contracting issues 
involved in this market. Future work may cover the contracting aspects of this market and 
the implications of these price structures on these biomass contracts, as they relate to 
sustainability in the market. 
 Comparing different alternatives in terms of price, stover harvested and 
environmental outcomes at the fuel shed will aid farmers, biorefineries and policy makers 
in creating an efficient and sustainable marketplace with cost effective management 
strategies. The modeling exercise and analysis will encourage thinking about this 
problem in terms of the density and scope of the supply shed through the distance 
traveled, quantity supplied and number of acres coupled with the environmental aspects 
that change how this market can operate.  Additionally, the analysis shows the potential 
advantages and disadvantages for different price incentive structures in meeting 
sustainability criteria under regulatory constraints.  Furthermore, the application of this 
problem can be used to think about harvesting stover for other uses, such as animal feed.  
2.1.1. Considerations in Aggregation 
 One can envision the biorefinery decision making process as divided into two 
phases.  In the first phase, the biorefinery must decide on the quantity of stover it wants 
to contract. Estimates for a switchgrass pilot plant are around 2,000 to 4,000 dry tons per 
day (Epplin, et al., 2007).  However, since biomass plants using stover are not yet at 
commercial scale, it is uncertain how much biomass would be needed to meet production 
goals. We will assume that a 70-mgy plant will need 571,000 tons of stover a year to run 
at capacity. Deciding on the total amount demanded above or below this amount, must 
take into account the uncertainty in supply from year to year due to weather and other 
yield determining factors with the costs associated. For the biorefinery, the unknown 
production risks may be mitigated through carrying inventories, especially if future 
shortages are likely to increase marginal costs (Cheung, 1969).  The biorefinery would 






 Contracts will likely be framed to either secure supply based on acreage or on 
tonnage or both depending on farmer and biorefinery risk preferences. The biorefineries 
can offer a basic price and quantity contract to famers in order to contract for this total 
amount. This will be the baseline pricing scenario to compare other types of contracts in 
order to illuminate tradeoffs in efficiency and outcomes.  These changes can be facilitated 
by increasing the market price and decreasing input costs to get different supply 
outcomes. These types of pricing options that focus on increasing outputs through 
increases in prices fall under the domain of incentive based contracts. Specifically, in 
these contracts farmers are encouraged to produce more by increasing the price per ton.  
 The second phase would assume that the biorefinery has a set quantity of stover 
demanded and then determines how this quantity would be contracted through production 
contracts.  When assessing whether to incentivize specific management strategies, the 
biorefinery may consider the higher costs derived from changing labor and management 
activities, through differentiated contracts that address the additional risks of participation  
(Paulson and Babcock, 2007, Tyndall, et al., 2011). This decision would involve the 
possible tradeoffs between the size of fuel shed in terms of distance from the plant 
(transportation costs) with the issues associated with contracting different management 
regimes for sustainable supply of stover. The amount of stover available will be 
determined by corn grain yields; the amount available to harvest will be determined by 
management decisions.  Potentially, this pricing option can incentivize farmers to 
practice specific types of conservation practices. These managements can include 
changing tillage practices, implementing different conservation strategies, and increasing 
the rate at which stover is harvested. Each of these strategies can be employed separately 
or in congruence in order to increase the amount of stover produced per farm. Given the 
cost-minimizing goals of the biorefineries, these production contracts would also need to 
be cost effective and supply-driven management regimes. 
 The purpose of differentiating the market participants by management decisions 
and their respective costs is such that the marketing chain operates as efficiently as 





choose farmers within the supply shed that are in a continuous-corn rotation in close 
proximity to the plant. Potentially, supplying from acres in continuous corn could be 
accomplished at the $80 per ton of stover benchmark. However, tradeoffs within the 
supply shed may prevent a single rotation type from being the most cost effective. These 
tradeoffs include, but are not limited to, the land in any one rotation through time
14
, 
regulatory and sustainability constraints, yield constraints, production risks, 
transportation and storage costs. Additionally, as stover is a secondary product to grain 
production and there may be other factors preventing farmers from choosing a continuous 
corn rotation. Thus, the gains from marketing stover may or may not be high enough to 
change crop rotations.  
 Differentiated pricing and management strategies can consider the role of 
environmental and regulatory issues that may change costs and practices at the farm-
level. Farmers surveyed in Iowa, indicated that the negative impacts on agronomic and 
environmental quality would deter farmers from harvesting stover, along with potentially 
unknown effects on yields (Tyndall, et al., 2011).  Sustainability in this market means 
that erosion rates remain under 5 tons/acre/year and soil organic matter is not being 
depleted. These standards can be enforced through external regulation or internally by 
farmer preference. Both potentially have the ability to increase the costs of procurement 
and decrease the amount of stover by limiting the management choices available, 
depending on several soil-level factors. However, given the heterogeneity of the soil 
throughout the Corn Belt, in some cases, increasing conservation practices will allow for 
more stover to be harvested. Given a region's expected endowment of stover, this analysis 
will illuminate some of the potential advantages and disadvantages of different pricing 
structures within the supply shed by incorporating environmental, agronomic and soil 
characteristics, to meet or respond to these sustainability goals. The likely consequence of 
such goals being that, either the price of stover would need to include the costs of 
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 Corn rotates with soybeans and other crops, if the land contracted rotates out of corn, then no stover can 





conservation or land and management strategies would be targeted such that 
environmental abatement costs are minimized.  
 Additionally, in terms of comparing an incentive and production based 
approaches with respect to the environmental outcomes, one may be more advantageous 
than the other depending on location. National regulations and incentives at the 
governmental level may be advantageous in setting standards, but can fail to capture the 
spatially explicit differences in environmental outcomes resulting in inefficiencies that 
can discourage innovation (Hirsch, 2001).  Incentive based environmental pricing may be 
more efficient than these national command and control or design standard approaches 
(Antle, et al., 2003).  Production based options may be more efficient in rotations or areas 
where additional incentives are needed to offset the environmental degradation. 
 From the standpoint of market participation and cost competitiveness among 
heterogeneous farms, the issue of environmental regulation and contracts may further 
distort competitive forces.  As environmental factors are tied to specific land parcels and 
the costs of addressing these issues are not uniform, some farmers may have a spatial 
market advantage (Vedder, 2001).  Laffont (1995) describes these types of environmental 
problems as moral hazard problems, where competition and cost minimization drive 
farmer decisions towards taking on greater environmental risks while remaining 
competitive with other market participants.  In a highly competitive market, a lack of 
bargaining power has the possibility of farmer neglecting or heavily discounting some of 
the internalized costs of the non-marketed environmental services that the stover 
provides. Parallels to the costs of environmental compliance may be seen in how the 
costs of transportation are handled in a competitive market, whether by the sellers or the 
buyers (Zhang and Sexton, 2001). In such a case, the uniformity of a supply-shed or 
nationally based policy may be the most cost effective. Therefore, in terms of analysis, it 
is important to consider the behavior of the market with and without sustainability 






2.2.1. Model Framework 
Given the complexity of the decision making process for the biorefineries, the farmers 
and the numerous tradeoffs that are considered, an optimization model is used to 
illuminate the supply dynamics of this market and to calculate the prices needed for each 
pricing option offered. This modeling effort includes the per acre analysis that was done 
in Chapter 1, additionally including differentiated prices and transportation costs to 
integrate the market. Considering the supply of stover, without assuming anything yet 
about regulation, we theorize that the biofeedstock market for the biorefinery (principal), 
would look like the following:  
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where 
        is price of stover harvested ($/ton) 
   is price of transportation from farm to plant  ($/ton/mile) 
      is the distance from farm j to the plant (miles) 
   is the stover available from each farm (j) (tons/acre) 
  
 
 is the incentive bonus paid to the farmer for quantity increases ($/ton) 
  
 
 is the production bonus paid to the farmer for specific management practices, in terms 
of increasing effort ($/acre) 
 ̂ is the total stover needed for production  






such that, the principal minimizes the expected cost of stover, subject to a minimum 
amount of stover needed to run the plant. The decision making variables for the plant are 
price and total quantity ( ̂), but the biorefinery could choose   , requiring a minimum 
amount from any given supplier. The bonuses in this model relate to the incentive and 
production based price schemes. In this analysis when incentive based pricing is 
considered,   
 
     
 
                       and vice versa for when production 
based pricing is considered when  
 
         
 
   and prices remain stable. These 
relationships are necessary, given that the effects on stover supply are interrelated with 
the management practices and the output prices.  
 Additionally, the biorefinery is assumed to be responsible for the costs of 
transportation.  There is a possibility that farmers, especially those further from the 
refinery may choose to undertake the costs of transportation as a means of securing the 
agreement. Depending on the assumptions of the scope of the marketplace, the market 
power of both the farmers and the refineries, the optimal transportation pricing may either 
be freight-on-board (FOB) or uniform delivery (UD) (Zhang and Sexton, 2001). The 
choice of transportation price will also be determined by bidding strategy from the 
farmers, assuming that the biorefinery has no preferential farm type. We formalize this 
assumption by noting that farmers will choose to harvest stover as long as they are 
equally as well off as they would be without harvesting stover. Therefore, we assume that 
the costs of transportation are covered by the refinery, either directly or as a monetary 
transfer to the farmers.   
The farmer’s simplified supply equation would look like, 
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are stover production costs for each farm; these costs are functions on rotation, 
tillage, removal, cover crop and barrier strip choices ($/ton) 
       is on farm storage costs, by month, times the number of months ($/ton) 
   is the amount of stover harvested; these costs are functions on rotation, tillage, 
removal, cover crop and barrier strip choices(tons/acre) 
   is the number of acres within the soil type at location j 
   is a random parameter that changes supply available (e.g. weather)  
 
In order to ensure that farmers are no worse off harvesting stover than not harvesting 
stover, a participation constraint is used. The participation constraint would be, 
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Since the production of stover is a secondary product to other economic activity, the 
participation constraint (P.C.) for the farmer to participate in the market would need to be 
greater than  
 , which would be the farmers alternative income without harvesting 
stover. 
 The variable      
 
 indicates that the cost of production is dependent on the total 
harvested and what management regime is chosen at optimal. These costs are increasing 
in output but not continuous, given that management choices are discrete.  Farmers will 
harvest stover up to the point that this marginal cost of producing stover will equal the 
price being offered. For this exercise we assume that the amount of stover produced is an 
expected yield multiplied by the acres in our representative farms.  Expected yields are 
calculated through an integrated wind and water erosion model, which is based on county 
yields and soil types, and delineates output based on management regimes. We also 
assume that for any given soil type the farmer will choose the same management type for 






 Equation (19) indicates that the optimal output for stover produced at any given 
farm may not be the maximum stover available, even under expected conditions where 
the randomness of outcomes,   is equal to zero. This randomness is important to 
consider in the wider analysis as farmers are likely to contract based on acreage, given 
the potential downside risks of contracting on quantities. Using expected yields limits the 
analysis in this regard. The distribution of    depends on the variability of outcomes 
through the landscape, some of which is random (e.g.  rainfall) and some of which is 
dependent on farmer effort (e.g.  harvest rates, management practices). However, as the 
empirical data is based on simulation the randomness in yields is simplified. The 
biorefinery in response to the production risk may carry inventories or contract with more 
acres. The biorefinery could potentially also contract based on location, as fluctuations in 
transportation costs from the time the contract is signed to delivery may change the 
effective cost of the stover; hence, the decision to separate storage and transportation 
costs from the price of stover. 
 The dynamics of the farmer side of the problem have the following optimization 
for the biorefinery, which can be populated with data and solved numerically, 
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(21) 
where for every ton of stover the marginal revenue of stover less the cost of producing 
stover is greater or equal to the utility of farmer j. For the moment we are simplifying the 
market and ignoring effort on the farmer’s behalf, as well as any potential constraint due 
to ensuring sustainability. 
 The difference in constraints will tell us if and by how much the biorefinery can 





incentivize an element of the vector       to change the optimal solution. Therefore to 
calculate the value of different management techniques, value of increasing distance 
traveled etc. the shadow values are used to estimate what the additional cost would be to 
incentivize these different decisions.   
 For example, the variable    is implicitly a function of different management 
techniques and the value of changing output at any one farm would alter all of the 
constraints,   
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(22) 
These options are weighed against the options of all the other farms in the fuel shed. 
From this we can also see that if a farm is producing at maximum capacity,    is binding. 
Any additional stover increases or decreases would need to either come from relaxing   , 
the amount of stover demanded, or   , which would be in terms of the randomness in 
actual output.  However, if a farm is not at maximum capacity, then the differences in 
production costs in         could be useful in planning at the biorefinery, assuming 
that these costs to incentivize higher production could be revealed. When constructing the 
menu of pricing incentives that the biorefinery would offer, it is important to consider 
how changing one aspect of the pricing or quantities would change the behavior of the 
farms above the simplest price offer. 
 Solving the system of equations for the price of stover, indicates several important 
considerations, 
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This is the minimum price that farmers would be willing to accept in order to harvest 
stover.  Tradeoffs could potentially be seen between the production and incentive based 





refinery is going to either choose to reward bonuses based on incentives or on production 
but unlikely both. For farmers to be indifferent between the production and incentive 
based pricing, the change of one unit in    based on management would need to equal the 
incremental change in output. This will hold true in our model, as management choices 
and outputs are discrete choices. However, changing a combination of managements may 
also result in the same output in a continuous system. For example, if the farmer added 
cover crops to a reduced tillage practice, they could get potentially the same outcome by 
choosing no-till and a different harvest rate. Additionally, if the incentive based on 
management practice only has a high impact on some soil types, it may not be as efficient 
at increasing output as an output based bonus.  
  While the analytical tradeoffs are useful in highlighting the complex choices of 
changing price, management and quantity parameters, they can be too general to 
illuminate the localized constraints of the fuel sheds.  Therefore a numerical approach is 
used within the optimization structure outlined in Equation (21) to highlight how these 
different pricing schemes can be applied in a more practical manner. Additionally, the 
different approaches in terms of production versus incentive based pricing may be more 
efficient by region.  
2.2.2. Alternative Pricing Structures 
The corn stover market can be based on acreage or volume and can specify the price, 
bonuses, timing, and management practices. The formation of the base price of stover is 
going to start at the minimum costs of producing and harvesting. The base price for the 
farmer would include, just the price of stover and the output,  
 {             } 
(24) 
This type of pricing option would assume that the seller market was competitive, and that 
farmers would produce where their marginal costs equal the price, and then contract 
based on the acreage or tonnage produced. The biorefinery could choose to fix prices, 





we have assumed that outputs are based on expected yields, and farmers are risk neutral, 
if these assumptions are relaxed, then farmers may see additional revenue risks with 
fluctuations in yields and higher outputs agreed upon.  Depending on the menu of options 
available, farmers may choose to underestimate their total amount by a percentage or 
increase the number of acres agreed upon. This would allow for lower amounts to be 
harvested on a per acre basis in the case of downside production risks.   
 The base price can be adjusted for the entire supply shed, or for groups and 
individual farmers, through the use of a menu of price options that offer bonuses related 
to output.  
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(25) 
These are incentive based pricing strategies where, the bonus increases the farmgate price 
for some farmers, but it is not tied to any specific management. These types of pricing 
options would be useful for the biorefinery to consider if they wanted to motivate farmers 
closer to the plant to produce more. The downside may occur when considering the 
environmental costs of producing stover, in that as harvest rates increase for some 
rotations, it decreases sustainability without offsetting conservation practices. 
 Alternatively, it may be too costly for the biorefinery for each farmer to produce 
the maximum stover per acre, given the costs of changing production managements, so 
the biorefinery may want to choose the management that is going to get the highest bang 
for their buck. Additionally, given that the actual production of stover may not equal the 
expected amount of stover, then it may be more efficient to incentivize farmers based on 
management with the probability of higher outcomes. These are typically called 
production contracts and specify the inputs and managements. The pricing strategy would 
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These yield or total quantity bonuses have the potential to segment the market by the 
efficiencies of the farmers, as the bonuses are tied to a specific management. This could 
cover, incentivizing farmers to switch rotations, increase cover crop usage, increase 
harvest rates, etc.  The bonus is based on a management regime, such as implementing 
the use of a cover crop, which indirectly increases the amount of stover that can be 
harvested.  As such, the units on this bonus are in dollars per acre and not dollars per ton.  
2.2.3. Assumptions 
In order for the biorefinery to know whether or not it should incentivize a specific 
management practice to increase production, then it is useful to know what management 
practices would be used in the absence of these bonuses.  This is useful information in 
several ways, namely, knowing which management strategies are productive on which 
acres of land, what the environmental outcomes will be and how to better incentivize 
both the productive and environmental resources inherent in these regional markets.  The 
biorefineries could ask for this information, observe this information or could estimate 
which practices are likely to produce what levels of output. In order to answer this 
question we start with the following assumptions about the pricing schemes and data: 
Pricing 
 We assume that the biorefinery offers a menu of take-it-or-leave-it options 
as a simplification of the modeling structure and as a result of the 
endowments of stover at other farms, which would assumedly decrease 
the bargaining power of the farmer. Only in the cases where the 
constraints are binding would farmers be able to negotiate.   






 We make the simplifying assumption that the decision making process and 
the reservation utility for the farmers is the profit that farmers gain from 
crops without harvesting stover, since stover is a secondary product to the 
production of corn grain.  
 Additionally, we assume that both principal and the agents are risk 
neutral, as a means to simplify the complex nature of the problem. In 
dealing with production risk, we assume that the biorefinery will likely 
adjust stocks from year to year. Assuming heterogeneity of farmers in the 
supply shed makes accounting for risk difficult, as if one farmer is 
unwilling to participate, then the biorefinery could either increase price or 
search for another farm.    
Assuming risk neutrality also means that the costs of sustainability are 
internalized. However, our assumption that farmers and biorefineries are risk 
neutral may not hold true in reality. Farmers may see harvesting stover as a long-
term risk to productivity or environmental stewardship and may decrease the 
quantities available or not participate in the market as a result of either higher 
reservation values or if environmental concerns are coupled with risk, increasing 
the price that biorefineries would have to offer in order to get acceptance. In 
addition, farmers are likely to comply with environmental regulation as eligibility 
for some federal programs is determined by meeting these environmental 
standards, though we start our analysis with this assumption of compliance 
relaxed.  
Data 
 One of the limiting factors that need to be considered is the current 
rotations of farm land in the supply shed. The only management choice 
that does not change in this analysis is the crop rotation, as we assumed 





 For this exercise, we are assuming that these rotations are stable for the 
length of the agreements.   
 To parcel out farms, the areas of the rotations were overlaid with the 
counties (yield estimates) and soil types (integrated model results) and 
distance (in 25 mile increments), such that all of the soil type X, in 
rotation Y, Z miles from the plant would make the same decision.
15
One 
assumption that is inherent in these calculations is that for soil types that 
correspond with these rotations, distances and harvest rates, the 
biorefinery would be able to negotiate for all of that soil type. 
Crop rotation choices may have to do with factors, like global crop, fertilizer and 
energy prices, which are beyond the scope of this problem. Limiting the ability for 
farmers to alter their rotations also limits the analysis to the lower bound of supply 
response.  
2.2.4. Data 
 Through management practices of the farm, a farmer can choose strategies that 
benefit both the environment and their profit margins through the removal of stover and 
application of conservation practices.  Accounting for the spatial heterogeneity of soil 
dynamics and erosion is accomplished using an integrated model which combines the 
Revised Universal Soil Loss Equation (RUSLE2) and the Wind Erosion Equation 
(WEPS).  These models are coupled with databases that contain relevant climate, soils, 
management weights, yields and location specific properties. The management options 
used for this economic analysis can be found in Table 2-1.  Changes in supply density 
and environmental outcomes can separately or simultaneously be affected by these 
different management regimes.   
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 This is of course a rough approximation to what actual farms would do, considering that farms have 
several different types of soil within a field but can manage stover collection using precision technologies 





Table 2-1: Regimes for the Integrated RUSLE2/WEPS Model 
Crop 
Rotation 




NCC No cover crop 
100rye 100% Rye winter cover 
40rye, 60clover 40% Rye winter cover, 60% Clover winter cover 
60rye, 40radish 60% Rye winter cover, 40% Oilseed Radish winter cover 
Tillage 
Regime 
RT Reduced Tillage: Chisel Plow, Disk tandem light finishing 




NRH No Residue Harvest 
MRH Moderate Residue Harvest: Approximately 35% 
MHH Moderately High Residue Harvest: Approximately 50% 
HRH High Residue Harvest: Approximately 80% 
Barrier 
Regime 
NVB No vegetative barrier 
SVB 
Strip vegetative barrier: modeled as cool season grass 3m 
wide in middle of slope 
Note: For each crop management zone and soil type, each permutation of the above regime was used in the 
model. 
 These scenarios represent the most likely cropping and management decisions for 
the Corn Belt.  Given the diversity in landscape of the region, the results from the 
integrated model were related back to geographic locations based on SURGO soil type
16
.  
The Cropland Data Layer for 2010 to 2012 was used to calculate acres in the three 
different rotations (Continuous Corn, Corn-Soybean and Corn-Corn Soybean). These 
rotations were overlaid with the SURGO soil type polygons (Figure 2-1).   
 Yields for corn grain were based on POLYSIS estimates at the county level.  
These were not included in the original dataset and therefore are backed out from the 
total biomass harvested in the first year, based on the percentages of removal and then 
divided by 56 to convert the amounts into bushels per acre.  Yield drag estimates were 
then subtracted from these estimates.  The scenarios were undertaken based on soil type, 
under the assumption that farmers will choose management practices to the dominant soil 
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 The data for these layers can be found the NRCS Soil data mart (SURGO, 
http://soildatamart.nrcs.usda.gov/), Geospatial gateway (Elevation and Cropland Data Layer, 






conditions of their farm for a three-year period.  These choices are limited by their 
respective effects on the t-factor, or overall erosion calculated within the model.  Erosion 
rates above the prescribed t-factor occur when adding the removal of stover beyond these 
management practices.  Based on the data from RUSLE2/WEPS we assigned rotations, in 
order to not allow the optimization model to switch rotations mid-period, the values were 
discounted to the present.  We surmise that the farmer can choose cover crop regime, 
tillage regime, residual removal regime, yield regime and vegetative barrier regime 
(Table 2-1).  The combinations of these six decisions enumerate 576 different options for 

















Table 2-2: Cost Estimates For the Model 
Item  Unit Value 
Corn
17
 $/ Bushel $      7.00 
Soybeans $/ Bushel $    12.00 
Stover
18
 - includes wrap ($5.6), fuel (2.66), labor($2.88), 
equip ($6.42) and storage ($16.47) 




100% Rye $/acre $    31.69 
 
40/60 Rye-Clover mix $/acre $    36.61 
 




Nitrogen $/ lb. $       0.54 
 
Phosphorus $/ lb. $       0.74 
 
Potassium $/ lb. $       0.57 
Vegetative barrier $/acre $  100.00 







Continuous corn (CG) $/acre $    78.80 
 
Corn in Rotation $/acre $    65.06 
 




Continuous corn (CG) $/acre $    78.80 
 
Corn in Rotation $/acre $    68.41 
 
Soybeans in Rotation $/acre $    74.67 
Misc.  Costs (seed, pesticides, hauling, drying, etc.)
20
   
 Continuous Corn yields less than 122 Bu/ac $/acre $  256.00 
 Continuous Corn yields greater than 184 Bu/ac $/acre $  294.00 
 Continuous Corn yields between 122 and 184 bu/ac $/acre $  289.00 
 Corn in Rotation, yields less than 130 Bu/ac $/acre $  252.00 
 Corn in Rotation, yields greater than 193 Bu/ac $/acre $  285.00 
 Corn in Rotation, yields between 130 and 193 Bu/ac $/acre $  282.00 
 Soybeans in Rotation $/acre $  150.00 
                                                 
 
17
 These costs are based on Dobbins, C., A. Miller, B. Nielsen, T. J. Vyn, S. Casteel, B. Johnson, K.Wise, 
and B. Erickson.  (2012) 2012 Purdue Crop Cost & Return Guide, Purdue Extension.. 
18
 These costs are based on Thompson, J.L., and W.E. Tyner. "Corn Stover for Bioenergy Production: Cost 
Estimates and Farmer Supply Response.", ibid. 
19
These costs are based on Duffy, M. (2012) Estimated Costs of Crop Production in Iowa - 2012. Iowa 
State University Extension. 
20
 These costs are based on Dobbins, C., A.  Miller, B.  Nielsen, T.  J.  Vyn, S.  Casteel, B.  Johnson, 





 Since one aspect of this modeling effort is to illuminate the advantages and 
disadvantages of managing the supply shed with respect to regional soil and 
environmental characteristics, two diverse supply sheds where chosen. Figure 2-2 and 
Figure 2-3 show the two locations and the availability of corn acres by distance from the 
plant and crop rotation.  These figures are based on two pre-existing biorefineries, in 
order to assume away other location based decisions, like access to end-markets and 
natural gas markets. There are multiple locations in which a biorefinery could establish a 
plant, and these two locations were chosen to highlight the tradeoffs in regions where 
conditions are favorable and average.    
 The first location was chosen as it had the largest amount of acreage in continuous 
corn for the 2010-12 rotations within a 50 to 100 mile radius of the existing 
Archers Daniel Midland plant in Clinton, IA.  Additionally, it is an area that has 
the potential to have high erosion rates.  
 The second location is based on the Emmetsburg, Iowa Poet plant, uses corn cobs 
and crop residues as a bioenergy feedstocks.  
These plants will enable us to compare and contrast the efficiencies that could be gained 
from the different market, regulatory and price based incentive structures. These 
efficiencies will be more pronounced given the starting rotations, yields and soil based 
outcomes that the fuel sheds are endowed with. The low stover prices provide a starting 
point for what additional incentives would be needed to change management strategies 
and increase outputs. Nutrients were considered separately, given the correlation with 
grain yields. 
 As the mathematical model evaluates the distance, production levels and costs for 
each farm with all other farms, as a simplification, farms with their centroids within 25 
mile bands were aggregated based on county, soil type and rotation. This decreased the 
number of permutations that the model had to calculate to just about a million 
observations for each refinery (each farm has 576 different management options, there 





and40 different soil types within 60 miles of the second plant). Each soil type can have 
up to 3 different rotations and can be located in different counties, which changes the 
yield estimates. To calculate the distance from the biorefinery to the representative farms 
we used the center of each polygon and then measured the distance in miles as the crow 
flies. Transportation costs are covered by the biorefinery at a cost of $16.69 per ton 
($0.35 per ton/mile)(Thompson and Tyner, 2011). 
 






Figure 2-3. Supply Area for Representative Plant 2 
 
 To illustrate the complexity of balancing supply availability, incentivizing 
management practices and distance in these representative areas, Figure 2-4 shows the 
tons of biomass that can be harvested within a 25 mile radius of the Representative Plant 
2, given the acres by soil type and management options. The farms will optimize their 
management decisions based on the price of stover and marginal cost and the most cost 
efficient will participate in the stover market. The advantage of changing the incentive 
structure based on management for select types of farmers is assumed to be that the 
biorefinery could reduce the number of acres, and thus transaction costs, which would 
need to be contracted. Increasing incentives will increase the supply by any single farm, 
until the farm reaches the maximum supply amount, or until it becomes too costly. 
Alternatively, given the heterogeneous nature of the farms, the response to different 
incentives will not produce a uniform change in outputs. This hypothesis will be tested in 






Figure 2-4. Supply Options for Representative Plant 2, Within 25 Miles 
 
One important caveat to the analysis is that the distribution of output over the surface J is 
not uniform and will change over time. There may be some areas in which the biorefinery 
would choose to restrict participation, for example, with transportation costs limiting the 
market or if there are sustainability criteria to be met. The distribution of yield outcomes 
will likely not be known fully when these agreements are signed nor when the biorefinery 
is planned.  The downside risk of low yields, the potentially high costs of under supply 
and heterogeneous nature of farms may make ranking farms inefficient.  As such an 
increase (decrease) in types will amount to the cost of procuring the stover and the 





2.3. Base Pricing 
Assuming that total stover demanded is fixed, and the biorefinery is looking to find the 
outcomes of the initial option of {            }, by optimizing Equation (21) with the 
numerical data for the representative biorefineries, assuming that both bonuses are 0. The 
biorefinery can set the price and acreage targets. Looking at these issues individually, we 
can get an approximate number of acres that would need to be contracted and a cost of 
procuring the stover. In the case of setting the stover price at the breakeven cost for the 
market, we can identify the most efficient farms and soil types. In order to gauge 
where in the market additional efficiencies can be gained, the starting price for a ton of 
stover is set at $34.03. This price covers wrap ($5.6), fuel (2.66), labor ($2.88), equip 
($6.42) and storage ($16.47) specifically related to stover harvesting, and is expected to 
be consistent throughout the landscape. Since nutrient replacement is an important 
consideration of cost for harvesting stover, these costs are considered separately to the 
base price. In addition, it indicates areas that may have higher costs based on the 
heterogeneous grain and stover yields throughout the landscape. In reality, these costs are 
considered simultaneously and farmers base their nutrient decisions at the farm, not acre 
level.  Solving for the lowest price possible to meet the 571,000 tons of demand, the first 
biorefinery could set their prices at $95.05 per ton, and for the second biorefinery the 
lowest market clearing price was $89.52 per ton. 
 At these results in acreage for the respective biorefineries, 250,413 acres were 
participating in the market from 305 different soil types for Biorefinery 1, and 291,539 
acres from 186 soil types were participating for Biorefinery 2.The differences in the 
prices between these two supply sheds are a result of the differences in expected yields 








Table 2-3: Cost and Environmental Metrics Base Pricing 
   Biorefinery  1  Biorefinery  2 
Cost for Stover (Million $) $54.27 $51.115 
Price ($/ton) $95.05 $89.52 
Total Costs for Transportation (Million $) $21.73 $19.876 
Total Acres 250,413 291,539 
Tons of Displaced Soil 695,692 698,415 
 % of Acres Unsustainably harvested 20% 15% 
 
Due in part to the composition of rotations, soil types and managements, 15 to 20% of the 
land in these fuel sheds are over the 5 tons/acre erosion metric and negatively impacting 
their soil organic matter.  
 As it is useful to see what the optimal management strategies are without the use 
of bonuses or incentives, the breakdown of management strategies by percentage of 
acreage at this price can be found in Table 2-4. These management choices are the result 
of the farms equating marginal cost with the price of stover.  The marketplace takes into 
account the differences in costs and available land by management strategy and chooses 
the least cost option for the biorefinery. We will consider this the baseline estimates for 
the market and would be the closest to a market based solution for these fuel sheds. It 
also gives us a set of metrics to discuss the advantages and disadvantages of other pricing 
strategies.  
 One result of the low price is that not all of these farms are harvesting at the 
highest possible output. There are several strategies that the biorefinery may employ in 
regards to making this market efficient. Biorefineries may desire farms that are producing 
at their maximum output available in order to decrease transportation and transaction 
costs.   For example, both biorefineries could provide incentives for a higher percentage 
of their acres contracted to harvest at the high harvest rates. To balance harvesting with 
conservation, more acreage could be incentivized to use a cover crop or a barrier strip to 
keep erosion rates low and soil organic matter positive. These conservation measures for 
continuous corn and for a corn-corn-bean rotation will also allow for more stover to be 





where the biorefinery would pay for the farmer to use a specific management regime. 
Alternatively, the biorefineries could choose to increase the price based on output, 
through incentive based pricing, and allow the farmers to choose the management 
strategy that would benefit their farm the greatest.  
Table 2-4: Management in the Baseline at lowest price 
     Biorefinery  1   Biorefinery  2  
Total Acres 250,413 291,539 
Management Regimes (as a % of total acres 
Rotation 
   
 
Continuous Corn 34.6% 15.6% 
 
Corn- Soybean 32.4% 58.3% 
 




100rye 38.2% 23.25% 
 
40rye, 60clover 27.1% 32.85% 
 
60rye, 40radish 17.5% 24.1% 
 
NCC 17.2% 19.8% 
Tillage 
   
 
No-till 47.76% 59.3% 
 




High 47.58% 39.4% 
 
Medium High 44.68% 58.4% 
 




No Barrier 48.6% 47% 
 




25 miles 9.1% 19.8% 
 50 miles 44.5% 48.4% 
 
75 miles 46.4% 31.8% 
 
2.3.1. Uncertainty in Supply 
Given the risks to production in terms of weather, maximizing output per farm may not 
be the most practical outcome. If in our analysis   , results in lower than expected 
output, then farmers producing at their maximum could face penalties for under 





substantially reducing production. The biorefinery could choose to focus on acreage, and 
then the quantity of acres would be fixed and these fluctuations in output per acre would 
be equally as important. The problem for the biorefinery is three dimensional, where the 
refinery could travel further, agree to more per acre (through increasing prices or 
incentivizing managements) or choose more acres. 
 In terms of the base pricing, for the first phase of the biorefinery’s decision 
making process, there are three factors to consider, the total stover demanded, the price 
offered and the output per farm. The design of the price scheme would then need to 
account for different price-quantity-acre scenarios, where these factors are either variable 
or fixed. Changing the total stover demanded shifts the production risk from the farms to 
the biorefinery. The biorefinery has three options – undersupply, capacity and over 
supply,(   ̂  ) - for contracting the amounts that are required to supply production at 
the refinery. If there is a negative shock in the supply shed then the biorefinery would 
need to find additional stover at the time of harvest to make up the difference. In such a 
case, there would be no provision for what management strategies would be most 
efficient, as stover would be harvested as available. Farmers would also be able to 
negotiate for higher prices, and limits on sustainability may still apply.  
 In general, the biorefinery may choose to weigh the distribution of output with 
costs of transportation. Since the concern is over the supply, ̂, the shadow cost of 
relaxing this constraint is   , which when solved by substitution of Equation (22) 
    (               )    [(       )  (            
 
)]       (27) 
where the costs of additional (less) tons of stover demanded depends on the price, the 
cost of storage, transportation costs and the marginal costs of producing any additional 
ton of stover. Incorporating the potential randomness of outcomes due to weather occurs 
with the constraint on actual versus predicted outcomes of    through   .  Farmers will 
produce the amount of stover such that it meets their participation constraint and no more 





additional stover will come from an additional farmer within the range of j when [   ].  
As concerning fluctuations in price or quantity, this also contends that for the biorefinery, 
changing the total stover demanded to  or  , will depend on the probability of the stover 
being available in the region, based on the    constraint. When the production risk is 
taken on by the farmer, the shadow value of   becomes the penalty of over- or 
undersupply. If the production risk is taken on by the biorefinery, then Equation (27), is 
no longer binding, and the refinery can choose either to incentivize a higher level of 
effort or choose more acreage.  
 Given the limited geographic area, if one farm experiences a shock, it is likely 
that farms nearby will also experience the same shock.  We assume a 5% and 10% 
increase and decrease in supply available for both firms to illustrate how prices, acreage 
and managements would need to change in order to cope with these shocks (Table 2-5). If 
the shock is positive, then there may be more stover per acre, but operational costs may 
increase slightly as management choices shift to harvest more. If the shock is negative, 
and the farm is not producing at its highest level of output, then prices would also have to 
increase to harvest more from those farms. 
 If these changes in supply occur after the acres are agreed upon, then to meet a 
5% decrease in supply, prices would have to increase for Biorefinery 1 by a minimum 
of$0.20 and $0.43 to encourage more harvesting of stover. For Biorefinery 2, the prices 
for an increase in supply would remain the same. Essentially, this amounts to no change 
in price in this case. For a decrease in supply, the prices would have to increase by a 
minimum of $1.02 and $3.96 to meet the 571,000 tons needed by the plant. The 
difference in prices between the biorefineries is due in part to the differences in rotations 
and yields in these two locations. For the second biorefinery, the change in supply 
coupled with higher prices means that most of the acreage already contracted must 
























Total 250,414 150,479 148,227 175,450 163,130 
Price $95.05 $94.85 $94.68 $95.48 $95.25 
CG 86,734 89,247 95,645 101,611 107,880 
CG,CG,SB 82,729 47,666 52,582 60,273 41,683 
CG,SB 80,951 13,567 -  13,567 13,568 
Biorefinery 2 
Total 291,539  265,165  291,020 279,074 291,175 
Price $87.15 $87.15 $87.15 $91.13 $88.17 
CG 45,567  52,335  77,538 12,301 76,283 
CG,CG,SB 75,928  54,350  115,363 19,786 106,592 
CG,SB 170,043  158,481  98,117 246,986 108,299 
 
This comes as a result that marginally increasing production on some acres may be more 
efficient than increasing the numbers of acres that need to be contracted, given the 
complex tradeoffs between management and outputs for different soil types.  For the first 
refinery, the supply is more flexible to increases and decreases in supply.  In some cases, 
the plant may choose acreage and management strategies based on the ability to fluctuate 
with prices and quantities.   
 The changes in acreage will also correspond to changes in management practices. 
These changes can be found in Figure 2-5 for Biorefinery 1 and Figure 2-6 for 
Biorefinery 2.  For the 10% increase in stover demanded, more acres are using cover 
crops, harvest rates increase, and other conservation management strategies are practiced 
for Biorefinery 1.  The story is similar for Biorefinery 2, as increased demand leads to 
more intense harvesting, and the offsets from other conservation practices are beneficial. 
One potential conclusion of this is that as the demand in the marketplace changes, the 



























 To analytically answer why there would be an intensification in supply on some 
acres we can look at the optimal decision making process on  .  When considering 
Equation (27), we can generate what the value of changing management or traveling 
further is worth to the biorefinery, 
   (               )    [(       )  (            
 
)]     
(28) 
The focus of this section is to illuminate the tradeoffs of price versus distance. Therefore 
we will temporarily assume that               
 
 are identical and are operating where 
marginal cost equals price and both   and    can be ignored. Considering heterogeneous 
farmers, crop rotations, yields, harvest rates, contract acceptance - the distribution will be 
lumpy through space.   
2.4. Incentive Pricing 
The alternative to setting the price and total quantity as in the previous section is to allow 
the price of stover to adjust such that the biorefinery can incentivize individual or groups 
of farms to produce higher amounts. The structure of this pricing scheme would 
be {           
 
      }, where the biorefinery does not require farms to practice any 
specific management, but there are incentives for higher quantities produced. We can 
either assume that these bonuses are individual, groups, or that they are the same for the 
region, essentially resulting in a higher base stover price. Since we assume that soil type, 
location and rotation are fixed, we will delineate farmers by these characteristics.  
 Without assuming identical farms, if the biorefineries were to choose their supply 
chain based on rotation, the tradeoff for the biorefineries would be in terms of the number 
of farms that would need to be contracted and the rate of harvest that would be required 
to meet supply (Figure 2-4). For Biorefinery 1, it is possible to contract solely with the 
same corn acreage as in the market baseline; however, these farms would need to 
intensify production, at higher costs to meet the biorefineries demands. When considering 
either of the soybean rotation options to meet the demanded additional acreage and 





Biorefinery, Biorefinery 2, would not be able to single-source a specific rotation given 
the current conditions.  
 In the case of these two refineries, the first refinery chooses to contract with 
acreage farther away from the refinery as there are potentially more efficient farms at a 
further distance. The alternative hypothesis is that the biorefineries could incentivize the 
size-management-rotation combination of these efficient farms, closer to the biorefinery 
if rotations were not fixed and the price was high enough to incentivize a switch. From 
the first chapter we assume that the most efficient rotation is continuous corn, no till, 
100% rye cover and no vegetative barrier. If we still assume that rotations are fixed, then 
the price and environmental metrics for differentiating prices by rotation and distance can 
be found in Table 2-6 and Table 2-7. 
Table 2-6: Cost and Environmental Metrics by Rotation 
   Biorefinery  1  Biorefinery  2 
Cost for Stover (Million $) $50.83  $50.13 
Price ($/ton)   
   Continuous Corn  $86.78  $ 85.87  
   Corn- Corn- Soybean  $88.92  $ 89.39  
   Corn – Soybean  $95.05  $ 87.95  
Costs for Transportation (Million $) $23.487  $18.88 
Total Acres 247,128  304,990  
Tons of Displaced Soil 644,358  731,525  
 % of Acres Unsustainably harvested 12% 9% 
 
Table 2-7: Cost and Environmental Metrics for Contracting within 25 miles 
   Biorefinery  1  Biorefinery  2 
Cost for Stover (Million $) $50.54 $ 49.43  
Price ($/ton)   
   25 miles  $87.97   86.25  
   50 miles  $89.17   86.52  
   75 miles  $95.05   86.93  
Costs for Transportation (Million $) $23.51  $19.24 
Total Acres  248,263   239,249  
Tons of Displaced Soil 644,358  855,320  






 If the biorefinery moves to bonuses based on soil type and output, the largest that 
the biorefinery 1 would need to pay out would be $61.01 and the smallest would be 
$50.79 per ton. These bonuses added to the base price would set the market clearing price 
of stover between $82.82 and 93.04 per ton, making certain soil types more attractive 
from a cost-minimization stand point.  For biorefinery 2, the individual bonuses would be 
between $47.92 and $53.12per ton. For the biorefinery 2, the effective price of stover 
would be between $79.95 and $85.15 per ton.  A move towards contracting with more 
acres in continuous corn and incentivizing the most productive soil types would indicate 
that it may be cheaper to harvest stover from these types. However, to meet the total 
demand by the biorefinery, acreage in other rotations and distances may be required. 
Using incentive pricing based on fixed types has the potential to save the refineries from 
$0.988 to $1.7 million in feedstock costs. Savings also occur in transportation costs for 
both the distance and rotation based contracting, such that the biorefineries could 
potentially save$0.64 to $1.7 million, depending on where acres are contracted. 
 One important caveat to this, that although it may make sense for the biorefinery 
to discriminate prices based on rotation from a cost standpoint it may not incentivize 
farmers to move towards continuous corn. And for farmers to be indifferent between the 
contracts for the different rotations, the cost of switching rotations, plus the price 
difference between the two contracts would need to be considered. These savings could 
be amplified if the assumption of fixed rotations were relaxed. Though the costs of 
switching rotations would need to be borne out through other market mechanisms, or be 
small enough such that the difference of changing rotations in not greater than the 
difference in prices between the different rotation.  
 One important concern is that in the absence of environmental regulation, any 
increase in stover price can increase the erosion rates beyond what is sustainable. For the 
base contract, for the first biorefinery 50,082 acres were above the 5 tons of soil/acre 
metric and were negatively impacting soil organic matter. However, with the contracts 
considered, the percentage of acreage unsustainably harvested either remained the same 





Intensifying the harvest outputs and bringing supply to the 25 mile radius for the first 
biorefinery decreased the number of unsustainable acres to 4,479. This adjustment is 
attributed to more acres using cover crops as a means to increase harvesting. For the 
second biorefinery, 29,831 acres were over the sustainability metric or 10% of the total 
acreage, resulting in 275,337 tons of soil being displaced. With the intensification of 
biomass harvested for the second refinery, 53,016 acres were over the sustainability 
metric, with a 10% increase in soil displacement.   
2.5. Production Based Pricing 
The biorefinery may choose to offer bonuses or require farmers to practice certain 
management practices. In doing so, the biorefinery chooses to decrease the variability in 
the market place with the goal of a stable supply in return for slightly higher costs. 
Approximating these costs can be accomplished through estimating either the difference 
from the optimal behavior or in some cases through estimating the average differences 
between employing the practice or not. The estimates for the biorefineries will be much 
less than estimates found in Chapter 1, given the regional differences of these 
biorefineries. In addition, the marginal costs and benefits for farmers are going to be 
driven by soil types and yields. The more homogenous the supply region, the smaller will 
be the difference among practices 
 In order to illuminate the tradeoffs of incentivizing management practices, we will 
now explicitly assume that the inputs to    and   
  are explicit.Maximizing the 
biorefinery’s decision making based on individual farm output would look like the 
following, where Mg represents the vector of managements that produce   , 
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(29) 
In the case of the over or undersupply of stover, there are some management strategies 





for management practices will change based on location and the constraints on the 
density of supply. And again are linearized around the optimal solution for the 
biorefinery indicated in the previous sections. The interpretation on the sign of these 
management practices indicate that prices would need to increase (decrease) by the value, 
in order for that management practice to be incentivized for the region. These do not 
measure the differences in individual contracts, but the average overall for the fuel shed, 
because prices offered to individual farmers may be known widely. 
  These price changes by acre can be found in Table 2-8. The base price per ton 
changes as different management practices are encouraged or penalized.  The prices by 
management that are negative would decrease the amount of stover available to harvest 
and would result in a lower per acre profit. The biorefineries may choose to discount or 
penalize acres using these practices.  Penalties would happen in this scenario, in part 
because both the biorefineries and the farms are considered risk neutral.   
  The refinery may also choose to only harvest with specific management 
practices, though homogenization of practices through the landscape may not be the 
ultimate goal. For example, if the biorefinery would only incentivize acres harvesting at a 
high harvest rate, the incentive based bonus per acre would start at $20.49 and then 
increase incrementally with each ton of stover harvested.  The total amount per farm 
could still change based on the other management choices that are available to choose 
from. Meaning, if the biorefinery sets the price and then offers a premium for higher 
harvest rates per acre, then the farm would then choose a management choice (tillage, 
cover, and barrier) to optimize under given high harvest rates.  
 Based on this we can see that the optimal management strategies for the first 
biorefinery are much more robust than those for the second biorefinery. The premiums 
for the second refinery are in high harvest rates and the use of 100% rye cover crops. 
Other options did not warrant a change in price, as the refinery was indifferent between 
other cover crops or harvest rates. As far as overall costs of procuring stover, 
incentivizing management practices and decreasing overall prices may be in the 





cover crops. For the second biorefinery, the base costs increase but the amount spent 
overall is lower.  
 From an environmental standpoint, the outcomes for sustainability are a mixed 
bag. In some of the management regimes, production pricing result in a lower percentage 
of acreage harvesting unsustainability. In the case of increasing harvest rates, for the first 
biorefinery this means that more cover crops and conservation practices are being used. 
For the second biorefinery, incentivizing cover crops directly decreases the impact of 
harvesting stover on soil erosion and organic matter. These prices are still not explicitly 






Table 2-8: Bonuses by Management 
 Biorefinery 1 Biorefinery 2 
 Tillage Removal Cover Barrier Tillage Removal Cover Barrier 
Cost for Stover (Million $)  44.01  44.45  60.32  49.96  50.12   52.66  52.481  50.235 
Base Price ($/ton) 77.58 75.21 77.10 76.63  90.19  90.19  86.96  86.96 
Management Bonus ($ per acre) 
        
Reduced Tillage  (10.45)    
    
No tillage  6.93      (5.23) 
   




Medium High Harvest   (23.60)   
    
Medium Harvest   64.08    
    




40% rye, 60% clover    126.19   
    
60% rye, 40% radish    141.23   
    
No Vegetative Barrier     25.69  
   
 (5.23) 
Vegetative Barrier     21.98  
    
Costs for Transportation (Million $ ) 24.113 21.517 24.089 22.077 18.382 20.975 20.975 18.382 
Total Acres 262,703 215,836 265,060 261,350 263,242 271,504 271,504 263,242 
Tons of Displaced Soil 673,878 432,359 721,613 725,478 881,826 723,108 723,108 881,826 










2.6. Environmental Regulation 
 Sustainability may be an underlying requirement of this market functioning. 
Establishing the mechanism for the biorefineries to restrict biomass collected from 
certain types of farmers, leads us into the effects that other external policies may have on 
the distribution and size of the market.  Addressing the regulation aspects of this market, 
through enforcing erosion standards than an additional constraint would needed to be 
added, and the environmental inputs of stover would need to be implicit or indicated as    
with each respective constraint, 
  (  )     ̅ (30) 
We assume that this constraint is external to the market; however, the costs of 
compliance are either borne by the farmer, altering the marginal costs of participating or 
by the biorefinery, altering the costs of procurement.  As such that the soil erosion losses 
are less than the standard put forth by the regulator, where  ̅  in the current case is 5 
tons/acre.  Regulation can also be done in terms of a tax or subsidy, which can change the 
effective price of stover or the price of inputs in harvesting stover (e.g. cover crops or 
barrier strips).  For some farmers, constraints on sustainability would be considered 
significant enough to be a barrier to entry as they would no longer be better off than not 
harvesting stover.  
 Other methods of regulation discussed involved targeting specific areas for 
conservation practices.  If regulation instead of setting  ̅ , constrains stover harvest to 
land, that is not classified as highly erodible, than the feasible supply areas would change 
and thus changing the distribution of supply though the region.  In addition, adding in the 
environmental constraint has the potential to change the threshold price that farmers will 
produce at by externalizing the costs of erosion control, as the production costs of 
production would need to be covered by pstover. However, from the first Chapter, we 
know that farms in continuous corn are likely to be practicing cover crops and 
conservation as a means to producing more stover. Therefore, for some farmers the costs 





 When considering the available management strategies and outcomes for 
Biorefinery 2, the set is much smaller than Figure 2-4. Figure 2-7 also shows the tons of 
biomass that can be harvested within a 25 mile radius, given the acres by soil type and 
management options. These constraints coupled with harvest rates and rotations could 
mean that fulfilling the demands of the biorefinery will increase supply costs incurred 
through increased transportation costs, as the biorefinery travels further to access more 
efficient farms. 
 







2.6.1. Environmental Incentives 
Regulation has an impact on the structure of the contracts and their pricing scheme. 
Those farms that have increased costs due to compliance may not be able to participate in 
the biofuels market. Farmers in each rotation will optimize based on these constraints in 
order to maximize profit. The first best outcomes from the market or from the contracts 
based on type will be distorted. Except for the case of the continuous corn rotation, where 
the social outcomes and private outcomes are the same for a majority of acres, regardless 
of the constraints on the market (Table 1-15, Table 1-18). However, the uniformity of 
policy may be more costly than using differentiated prices to gain economic efficiency 
while incentivizing environmental constraint. The biorefinery may decrease the costs of 
compliance as a secondary effect to minimizing acreage and increasing the price of 
stover. The biorefinery may also choose to create a menu of prices in which the incentive 
to use conservation management is included and required.   
  The nexus of the environmental and moral hazard problem can come from 
regions where increasing stover harvested and or decreasing acreage increases the rate of 
erosion or the degradation of soil organic matter. The second biorefinery is an example of 
how, given current rotations, a biorefinery may choose to increase the rates of harvest in 
rotations (corn-corn-soybean) when increasing conservation practices are more costly 
than the benefits in stover harvested. In this case, regulation increases the costs for a 
larger proportion of the supply shed, decreasing the effects on competition. If regulation 
does not exist and prices do not incentivize conservation then the environmental 
outcomes for this region may be significant as farmers potentially neglect the 
environmental costs to pursue higher profits from harvesting more stover. This may me a 
future concern for the biorefineries as the participation of farmers could decreases if 
erosion or soil quality losses become apparent. 
 Within the stover marketplace, one of the fundamental aspects of stover collection 
is the tradeoffs that removing stover has with environmental factors, such as erosion, 
nutrient replacement and soil moisture management.  These are non-marketable services 





services as in actuality these are internalized costs to production.  We could infer how a 
farmer feels about soil erosion by the practices that they employ on their farm.  As we’ve 
seen in Chapter 1, the variation of outcomes that are possible depending on these 
practices represent scenarios of what could happen if the incentives are not geared 
towards some kind of conservation, and private costs are low or non-existent.   
 Incentivizing sustainability while also being concerned with the amounts of stover 
harvested creates a conflict for farmers who practice corn-corn-soybean rotations. While 
in the case of farmers in corn-soybean rotations, incentivizing the managements leading 
to sustainability will improve harvest outcomes. Farmers in continuous corn rotations do 
not need any additional incentives as their first best solution is the same regardless of the 
sustainability criteria. The adverse selection model will still be required to incentivize 
farmers to reveal their rotation type, but the levels of effort for the corn-soybean and 
corn-corn-soybean rotations will need to be incentivized, at least for some soil types. 
2.6.2. Base Pricing Under Environmental Constraint 
Starting with our simple base price option, the biorefineries can again solve for the 
optimal price under sustainability. The prices for compliance will undoubtedly increase 
the price of stover if no differentiation in type or management is considered. Instead of 
focusing on the 15 to 20% of acres that were being unsustainability harvested, this single 
priced market requires the entire supply shed to respond uniformly.  Table 2-9, shows 
that the impact of regulation increases the price for Biorefinery 1, by approximately 
$5.18 per ton and decreases the price for Biorefinery 2 by approximately, $2.60 per ton. 
The difference in prices is a result of decreased choices in management regimes, an 
increase and a shift in the acreage contracted. 
 The agronomic characteristics at the first biorefinery lend themselves to higher 
amounts harvested in the continuous corn acreage and the use of cover crops is almost 
required. Though this is not the case for the second biorefinery, as sustainability 
constraints are applied the harvestable amount per acre is capped and more acres need to 





be required to meet production goals, more land that could be affected by shocks.  The 
management strategies for the base contract can be found in Table 2-10.  
Table 2-9: Cost and Environmental Metrics Base Contract Under Environmental 
Regulation 
   Biorefinery  1  Biorefinery  2  
Cost for Stover (Million $) $57.23 $49.63 
Price ($/ton) 100.23 86.93 
Costs for Transportation (Million $) $169.35 $24.50 
Total Acres  157,862  327,842 
Tons of Displaced Soil 140,706 304,603 
% of Acres Unsustainably harvested 0% 0% 
 
 
Table 2-10: Management for the Base Contract under Sustainability 
     Biorefinery  1   Biorefinery  2  
Total Acres  157,862  327,842 
Management Regimes (as a % of total acres 
Rotation 
   
 
Continuous Corn 56.43% 18.91% 
 
Corn- Soybean 29.42% 31.33% 
 
Corn-Corn Soybean 14.15% 49.77% 
Cover Crops   
 
100rye 99.99% 29.40% 
 
40rye, 60clover 0.01% 19.07% 
 
60rye, 40radish 0.00% 11.21% 
 





No-till 85.85% 72.17% 
 
Reduced till 14.15% 27.83% 
Harvest Rates   
 
High 99.99% 26.99% 
 
Medium High 0.01% 43.00% 
 
Medium 0.00% 30.01% 
Vegetative Barrier   
 
No Barrier 100.00% 49.36% 
 
Some Vegetative Barrier 0.00% 50.64% 
Distance   
 
25 miles 5.94% 6.79% 
 50 miles 28.98% 28.79% 
 





The key aspect of this shift in management and in acreage has much to do with the 
tradeoffs of incentivizing different practices and changing the acreage that is contracted. 
From the base contract to the base contract including sustainability, 26% of the same 
acreage remained under contract for Biorefinery 1 and 12% for Biorefinery 2.  
2.6.3. Incentive Pricing Under Environmental Constraint 
If the biorefinery can differentiate the price of stover based on fixed characteristics, then 
under sustainability constraints, the cost to the refineries may not need to be as large. 
Table 2-11 and Table 2-12, show the differences in prices and acres under incentive 
based pricing.  For the biorefineries the differences in costs between rotations, indicates 
the additional costs of compliance. As expected, continuous corn is a cheaper alternative 
to the corn-soybean and corn-corn-soybean rotations. The biorefineries may prefer to 
contract solely with continuous corn acres but be limited by land that is in that rotation. 
Again, if the assumption of rotation being fixed is relaxed, then the farms would need to 
be able to produce at the lower cost including the costs of changing acreage and meeting 
sustainability constraints.  
Table 2-11: Cost and Environmental Metrics for Rotation Based Incentive Prices Under 
Environmental Regulation 
 
Biorefinery  1 Biorefinery  2 
Cost for Stover (Million $) 52.03 49.25 
Price ($/ton) 
  
Continuous Corn 85.90 84.37 
Corn- Corn- Soybean 86.65 88.40 
Corn – Soybean 106.08 86.39 
Costs for Transportation (Million $) $23.99 $24.58 
Total Acres 265,586 336,359 
Tons of Displaced Soil 332,815 318,738 








Table 2-12: Cost and Environmental Metrics for Distance Based Incentive Prices Under 
Environmental Regulation 
 
Biorefinery  1 Biorefinery  2 
Cost for Stover (Million $)  $81.396   $49.881  
Price ($/ton)   
   25 miles 87.45 87.00 
   50 miles 87.40 87.00 
   75 miles 100.23 88.00 
Costs for Transportation (Million $) $77.34  $22.21  
Total Acres  616,253   245,281  
Tons of Displaced Soil  342,595   159,324  
 % of Acres Unsustainably harvested 0% 0% 
 
The cost of compliance still increases the cost of meeting supply goals, but not to the 
extent that only changing the base price uniformly affects the bottom line. The refineries 
must intensify production on some acreage and still significantly changes which acres are 
contracted. Comparing this incentive based pricing scheme with and without 
sustainability impacts the price offered by rotation and distance. For the first biorefinery, 
under sustainability, the price by rotation decreases for all but the corn-soybean rotation. 
In terms of the change in prices for distance from the biorefinery, the difference in price 
has to do with the composition of rotations in those regions. Compliance costs may be 
higher for acres further from the biorefinery for several reasons, including the correlation 
with land and rotation in these areas.  
2.6.4. Production Based Pricing Under Environmental Constraint 
Production pricing may be the most efficient strategy under sustainability, as the 
biorefinery can tailor contracts to cover the costs of different conservation measures 
while meeting the goal of least cost supply. Farms may choose to accept these prices 
connected to managements if they need additional help in meeting sustainability 
constraints. For example, the biorefinery can contract with the most cost-efficient acres as 
in the previous sections and require or compensate for additional conservation from only 





 From the first set of production based pricing, the lowest percentage of acres 
unsustainably harvesting stover were 8% for the first refinery and 9% (under incentive 
pricing) for the second refinery. Under sustainability, these percentages drop to zero and 
the defining criteria will then be by ranking costs of procurement and transportation. 
Sustainability may increase either the number of acres under contract or the concentration 
of supply from each acre, capped to sustainable limits.  The prices in Table 2-13 
represent the costs of compliance and the additional incentives that would be needed to 
encourage these practices. As a reminder, farmers would be incentivized to choose these 
management practices and then choose the other aspects of the management regimes 
independently. Meaning that incentivizing a high harvest rate, would allow for farmers to 
choose the remaining conservation practices to best fit their farms. 
 The penalties on the conservation practices of 100% rye cover and vegetative 
barrier indicate several things. From previous analysis we know that farms practicing 
100% rye may not need any additional incentives as more stover can be harvested when 
this practice is implemented. In addition, the use of cover crops allows these farms to be 
sustainable without any additional conservation practices.  Since the farmers are 
considered risk neutral, penalties may be used to induce this desirable effort without 
additional information needed.   Therefore, these benefits may not need to be covered by 
the biorefinery and could indicate that the refineries could offer a much lower price per 
acre for farms practicing these management strategies, as long as they still met their 
participation constraints. Alternatively, the biorefineries could make the farmers 
practicing these conservation managements residual claimants, knowing that they will 
meet the sustainability criteria at harvest and share the benefits of the additional stover 
harvested through an ex ante lump-sum transfer. However, if these farmers are risk 
neutral or cannot be punished for not using 100% rye or vegetative barrier strips, then the 
biorefinery may choose to implement a limited liability constraint. This type of constraint 





Table 2-13: Bonuses by Management Under Sustainability 
 Biorefinery 1 Biorefinery 2 
 Tillage Removal Cover Barrier Tillage Removal Cover Barrier 
Cost for Stover (Million $) 47.791 58.119 35.977 39.170 48.619 51.680 48.327 52.062 
Base Price ($/ton) 72.49 70.83 71.88 70.93 87.91 86.90 87.25 87.89 
Management Bonus ($/ acre)         
Reduced Tillage 16.78    (6.57)    
No tillage 35.34    4.49    
High Harvest  29.39    9.51   
Medium High Harvest  110.24    0.35   
Medium Harvest  65.79    20.01   
100% Rye Harvest   (87.29)    (37.05)  
40% rye, 60% clover   42.35    17.20  
60% rye, 40% radish   98.66    11.55  
No Vegetative Barrier    68.27    9.32 
Vegetative Barrier    (11.43)    (11.98) 
Costs for Transportation (Million $ ) 23.311 23.040 19.282 24.021 23.238 21.888 22.317 23.823 
Total Acres 260,771 247,396 205,832 274,132 254,527 260,903 249,069 249,013 
Tons of Displaced Soil 301,448 330,739 245,195 333,949 273,851 351,944 308,841 273,431 












2.7. Results and Conclusions 
For a Biorefinery to choose to offer these different pricing options, the costs must be 
competitive, especially under sustainability constraints. There are several ways in which 
a biorefinery can decrease costs of procuring stover. The biorefineries may choose to 
offer the most cost effective base, incentive and production pricing options to farmers 
through a menu of contracts. Considering both price differentiation and management 
requirements farmers may either be indifferent between the outcomes or choose the most 
beneficial contract to their current production management regimes. These contracts may 
be flexible to include considerations on different supply shocks and sustainability. For the 
first refinery, the most cost effective contract may be a production based contract; for the 
second an incentive approach may be most effective. Under sustainability constraints a 
production based contract may be the most cost effective for both refineries.  These 
results may change as different assumptions on the composition of farms and whether or 
not rotations are fixed.  
2.7.1. Discussion of Institutional Factors 
Valuing soil through the market is complicated as numerous factors are involved in 
adoption, profitability and attitudes towards stewardship, conservation and soil erosion 
activities (Chouinard, et al., 2008).  At the farm-level, farmers have different perceptions 
on the actual costs of erosion; additionally it can take years for erosion to be visible.  As 
such, the economic decision of the farmer weighs the direct costs of undertaking 
conservation measures and replacement costs through increased inputs and increased 
equipment costs with the opportunity costs of forgone future productivity through soil 
losses (Barbier, 1998, Javurek, et al., 2007, Larson, et al., 2001).  However, developing a 
market around erosion is not as straightforward; given the nature of non-point source 
pollution and that erosion in its simplest terms changes the quality and quantity of land.  
These changes can be reflected in land values and growing suitability indices (Duffy, 
2012).  Therefore, the importance of erosion management is tied to the market for land 
and its productivity.  Other environmental factors such as water availability, water quality 





considering the economic benefits of stover and the relationship to land productivity.  
The impacts of stover removal on land quality and as a long-term investment strategy 
may dissuade certain soil types from participating in this market or incentivizes farmers 
to practice conservation tillage and cover crops, but there are no guarantees. Uncertainties 
of what market pressures, climate changes and harvestable amounts will have on soil 
moisture, quality and fertility are significant in determining which and where farmers 
participate in the corn stover market (Chakir and Parent, 2009). 
 For landowners, using conservation to improve soil quality can improve the resale 
value of the land and rental prices.  Farmland with higher soil quality also needs less 
inputs and has greater returns on the investment.  In rural areas the importance of soil 
quality had a higher correlation with land values  (Nickerson, et al., 2012).  Compounded 
into the land market-conservation issue are the differences between owners and operators.  
Tenant farmers have been less likely to engage in conservation activities, and non-
operator owners tended to own less valuable land (Soule, et al., 2000).  Depending on 
rental agreements between these two parties conserving and managing soil resources may 
not be well defined, though unlikely.  However, rental agreements between owners and 
operators and contracts between producers and biorefineries also need to be in line.  
Depending on the institutional arrangements between these interested parties, some of the 
environmental risks could be managed through alternative conservation practices, like 
cover crops and green manure.  However, given the cost-competitive aspects, potential 
lack of policy-based incentives, and limited numbers of farmers currently practicing these 
alternatives, it is debatable what will compel farmers towards increasing conservation 
costs, especially as the benefits of conservation are long-term and with the short-term 
uncertainties and risks in this market. And these third-party arrangements may further 
effect the contracting analysis above by decreasing land available or limiting the 
maximum that a farmer could harvest.  
 One assumption that is worth relaxing when considering the effects of regulation 
would be the voluntary nature of these programs and the non-adoption of cover crops and 





percent of farmers currently use cover crops (Singer, et al., 2007).  This could be 
attributed to underestimated costs of using cover crops, especially in regards to the timing 
of seeding and killing of the cover.  For a more in-depth discussion of the benefits and 
costs of using cover crops as an extension of this work see Pratt (2012).  Additionally, the 
rates of adoption for different conservation methods – tillage and barrier strips - are non-
uniform through the landscape.  For a more in-depth discussion of adoption and non- 
adoption of these practices, see Tolvier (2010).  The concluding point is that in order for 
the usage of cover crops and conservation tillage to be adopted, multiple factors need to 
be considered, and farmers need to understand the benefits and be willing to undertake 
the costs of these measures in order to participate in the biomass market.  In addition, the 
profit and incentives for the farmer has to be great enough to spur adoption in a 










As the market for corn stover develops, there are several key environmental tradeoffs that 
need to be considered, especially in terms of managing soil resources.  In Chapter 1, we 
discussed these tradeoffs in the context of farmer decision making at the field level.  
Using the most likely management strategies within a five state sample area of the 
Midwest, agronomic and economic factors were considered.  These agronomic results 
were obtained from an integrated RUSLE2/WEPS model, incorporating conservation 
tillage, cover crops, barrier strips, rotations and harvest rates.  From the integrated model, 
the amount harvested per acre, the amount of soil erosion, a metric on the effects to soil 
organic matter and management costs were calculated and incorporated into a simple 
profit maximization model. The analysis started with the assumption that prices were 
fixed at $80 per ton and that the market would exist throughout the sample area, without 
regard for competition, current rotations or sustainability.  However, each of these 
assumptions was tested throughout the dissertation. The maximization model was then 
calculated under different states of nature and decision making parameters for each of the 
sample states.  
 The results of the modeling exercise show how different costs for erosion, 
biomass and conservation management will affect outcomes at the farm level under 
different scenarios.  Sustainability was defined to limit soil erosion from wind and water, 
to 5 tons/acre/year and the soil organic matter metric (SCI) to be positive.  These 





Tightening the assumption that the market would freely choose rotations, the 2010-12 
crop rotations were used. This approach delineates the optimal outcomes by land within 
these rotations, thus reflecting farm level decision making more realistically but 
statically. Assuming these rotations are stable, areas that were more or less sustainable in 
terms of stover harvest and conservation could be identified. 
 Chapter 2, moves from the farm level to the market, and considers how prices for 
stover and incentives for management practices through contracts could change the 
outcomes for different biorefinery locations. This chapter changes the assumptions on 
price and competition that were not considered at the farm-level; though the analysis 
incorporates the same farmer decision making process and integrated agronomic 
modeling as in the first chapter.  The integration of farms into a single market place 
additionally considered the tradeoffs of the heterogeneous farmers and transportation 
costs in how this market would operate efficiently and regionally.  
 The key assumptions of this chapter were that farmers and biorefineries were risk 
neutral, rotations were fixed and that farms were identified by soil type.  Aggregation of 
soil types was done by 25 mile sections from the refineries in order to decrease the 
permutations of possibilities. These simplifying assumptions were made such that the 
problem was tractable. The pricing scenarios in this chapter also consider the market 
outcomes with and without sustainability constraints. Comparisons or ranking of 
incentive structures were done on price, acreage under contract, total costs of 
transportation from farm to refinery and on sustainability. In addition, assuming stability 
in crop rotations simplified the problem further, creating a lower bound for supply 
response.  Relaxing this assumption would require not only switching costs between 
rotations in technical terms, but also in regards to relative prices. This would link the 
price and demand for a regional stover market to corn and all other crops through 
changing the bounds for the participation constraint. 
 The major findings of this research are the explicit tradeoffs of environmental 
sustainability in terms of soil quality and quantity and the economics of incentivizing the 





depend on the locational factors. In some areas and rotations, the potential implications 
are positive. Soils that are less prone to erosion may only be limited by the maintenance 
of soil organic matter and nutrient replacement. These soil types would not need a change 
in management or conservation practices to harvest sustainably.  In some areas, adding 
the market incentive to harvest stover may dually increase the usage of conservation 
management practices, such as cover crops, tillage and barrier strips, decreasing the 
overall negative environmental impacts of farming. The costs of these practices would be 
offset in the benefits of market opportunities for stover. In areas that are deemed sensitive 
to erosion, harvesting stover could impact the environment either positively or 
negatively. Without additional conservation, constraints on erosion or soil organic matter, 
harvesting stover could be detrimental or vice versa. These regional concerns may be 
covered through national regulation and enforcement of sustainability standard, 
minimized through price incentives or both.  Alternatively, these areas could potentially 
be excluded from the market, either at the producer or refinery level, if sustainability is 
not accounted for. As these factors are aggregated to the market, the level of demand, 
distance traveled and market price will determine how these different impacts are 
considered. If there are no sustainability constraints, the price can be lower but only areas 
that see economic benefits will practice conservation.  
 The analysis throughout the dissertation is intended to illuminate different 
avenues for thinking about stover harvesting in terms of the environment and regional 
farm and market limitations. The tradeoffs are inherently multidimensional and as the 
market develops, the aspects of space and density of these regional supply sheds may be 
considered. Policy, biorefineries and farmers could use the analysis to consider 
alternative avenues for supply chain management, conservation planning or income 
generation. In addition, the use of stover as a secondary product for animal feed could use 
the same analysis to consider the economic tradeoffs of different harvest levels and soil 
impacts.  
 However, there are limitations to the research herein.  Some of the assumptions 





truth’. Farms are typically comprised of several different soil types and may or may not 
use precision technologies to manage them by soil type, as considered here. Farms may 
choose rotation based on macroeconomic factors that were beyond the scope of this paper 
and rotations can fluctuate. This may not be a single direction process, as including stover 
may incentivize farmers to switch rotations in order to take advantage of the additional 
income. Farms also have more options when it comes to conservation and management 
that what we considered. Precision agriculture may also be able to customize stover 
harvesting to the exact field characteristics and decrease the impact on sustainability. All 
of these would have costs or benefits that were not explicitly considered here. 
 In addition, there is a limitation on the dynamic nature of this problem. The 
effects of soil erosion may take decades to fully realize and are highly dependent on soil 
level characteristics. Changes in managements, relative crop prices, changes in 
technologies, and farmer response may change in a relatively short amount of time.  The 
estimates from the integrated model are useful when considering the management choice 
as stable and as part of a long-term conservation strategy and may not hold under rapid 
changes. Especially, if farmers consider soil erosion in terms of thresholds instead of as 
marginal changes, little changes in management strategies may not have significant 
impacts. Also, these marginal effects on yields may be spread over a long time and 
distance when considering the level of stover demanded, the procurement distance 
traveled and the intensification of practices.  Minimizing these widespread spatial and 
temporal effects may further increase the rate at which society and these markets discount 
soil resources, at least when considering the aggregate market.   
 Additional research considering the ecosystem service benefits of stover is 
needed. These services include moisture management, thawing in the presence of stover, 
and micronutrient replacement. Furthermore, timing aspects with respect to the 
harvesting, weather and managing of other farm related activities may limit stover 
production. In addition, the aspects of risk through the marketplace and vis-à-vis 
environmental decision making may alter the behavior of farmers under different climate 





risks, the contribution to decreased erosion or improved soil can be economically and 
socially motivated. As an example, cover crop adoption may not be widespread for 
several reasons. If farmers do not see the economic or social costs of erosion on-site, or 
they perceive the costs of cover crops to be high, then farmers are not likely to adopt 
cover crops.  Tradeoffs to improved soil organic matter on productivity, or how much soil 
organic carbon is needed in order to improve soils beyond their current levels is still 
widely debated. Without a better understanding of these effects, assessing the economic 
decision making process will also be limited. Additionally, the benefits of erosion control 
vary depending on the location, soil type, and other numerous factors that change through 
the landscape. Therefore, the analysis of factors may not be generalizable, further 
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If the biorefinery can choose output for the farm, the following becomes relevant, 
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